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NOTES
TURNING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
CHALLENGE "ON ITS FACE":
WHY FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE
STATUTES DEMAND FACIAL
CHALLENGESt
You can paint it any color, so long as it's black.
- Henry Ford1
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Hobson lived in Cambridge, England.2 A Sixteenth Cen-
tury stable manager, Hobson was a courier of goods, people, and even
the University Post. Upon inheriting his father's cart and eight horses
at the age of twenty-four, he began renting the horses to undergradu-
ate students. His stable soon boasted over forty riding horses and a
line of new wagons, but the students, Hobson discovered, tended to
request the same few hackney horses again and again. Realizing that
his hackneys were overworked, the liveryman settled upon a rotation
system whereby he placed only the well-rested horses in the stall
nearest the stable door. When a would-be renter arrived, he was
shown all the horses in the stable, only to be told that the horse closest
to the door was the only horse for rent. Thus, young Hobson ensured
that "every Customer was alike well served according to his Chance,
and every Horse ridden with the same Justice.",3 And so is the origin
t Awarded the ninth annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student Note
Award, as selected by the Volume 54 Editorial Board.
1 THE HENRY FORD MUSEUM, THE MODEL T, at
http://www.hfmgv.org/exhibits/showroom/1908/model.t.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2004)
(attributing the quote to Henry Ford).
2 See ALLAN BRIGHAM, THOMAS HOBSON 1544-1630, at
http://www.cambridge.gov.uk/cambridge800/hobson.htm; WKIPEDIA, HOBSON'S CHOICE, at
http://en.wikipedia.orglw/wiki.phtml (last visited Sept. 16, 2004); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1076 (1986).
3 Joseph Addison, THE SPECTATOR, Oct. 14, 1712. The first written reference to the
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of the proverbial Hobson's choice-"Where to elect there is but one,
'Tis Hobson's choice: take that or none."4
A "Hobson's choice" is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition-"an ap-
parent freedom of choice where there is no real alternative."5 In cer-
tain respects, the Commerce Clause6 of the United States Constitu-
tion, which grants Congress the power to regulate commerce among
the States, presents litigants and judges with a Hobson's choice. The
structure of the Commerce Clause and the power it grants to Congress
leave the courts no choice but to determine the constitutionality of a
commerce-based statute "on its face" and preclude judges from in-
validating such statutes on an as-applied basis. In effect, courts and
petitioners may choose between as-applied and facial challenges to
Commerce Clause regulations, so long as they choose the facial one
"closest to the door."
Offering the judiciary such a "choice" on Commerce Clause chal-
lenges seems at odds with the long-held, traditional notion that "the
normal if not exclusive mode of constitutional adjudication involves
an as-applied challenge, in which a party argues that a statute cannot
be applied to her because its application would violate her personal
constitutional rights."7  Generally, the lower federal courts have
adopted this traditional approach when faced with constitutional chal-
lenges to Commerce Clause cases and have failed to note how the
broad but limited power expressly granted under the Commerce
Clause makes the as-applied challenge inappropriate in such cases.
But in 1968, the Supreme Court noted in Maryland v. Wirtz8 that its
own jurisprudence had established "that where a general regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis char-
acter of individual instances arising under that statute is of no conse-
source of the phrase "Hobson's choice" was as follows:
Mr. Hobson kept a Stable of forty good Cattle, always ready and fit for travelling but
when a Man came for an Horse, he was led into the Stable, where there was great
Choice, but he obliged him to take the Horse which stood next to the Stable-Door: so
that every Customer was alike well served according to his Chance, and every Horse
ridden with the same Justice: From whence it became a Proverb, when what ought to
be your Election was forced upon you, to say, Hobson's Choice.
Id.
4 THOMAS WARD, ENGLAND'S REFORMATION: A POEM IN FOUR CANTOS, Canto 4, 373
(1747).
5 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICrIONARY 1076 (1986).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
7 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing,
113 HARv. L. REV. 1321 (2000).
8 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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quence." 9 In 1995, the Supreme Court affirmed this understanding
and reiterated in its landmark United States v. Lopez 1° decision that
the de minimis instance of the claimant's activity is irrelevant for de-
termining the constitutionality of a federal statute passed pursuant to
the Commerce Clause." Following the Lopez decision, defendants
challenged a variety of commerce-based statutes both facially and as-
applied; 2 but only in the last year have the lower courts begun to take
seriously the suggestion that as-applied challenges fail to properly
determine the constitutionality of commerce-based statutes. 3 With a
pair of 2003 decisions directly addressing this question,' 4 the Ninth
Circuit has sparked an important discussion likely to be joined by the
judiciary at-large.
To be sure, the as-applied challenge is an attractive alternative to
striking down a statute on its face. As-applied adjudication allows
judges to limit congressional power by essentially ruling that the
prosecution misapplied the law in this case, leaving the statute in
place for enforcement against other offenders.' 5  In these cases, the
challenger's peculiar activity is thus sliced away from the otherwise
9 Id. at 196 n.27. The Supreme Court overruled Wirtz in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976), but only insofar as Wirtz stood for the proposition that Con-
gress could use the Commerce Clause to invade the domain of the States' performance of essen-
tial government functions. In other regards, Wirtz's Commerce Clause jurisprudence remains
intact, as demonstrated by the Court's approving reference to it in United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995). Usery was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overturning the previous determination that the Commerce Clause
does not empower Congress to enforce minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act because those provisions were found not to destroy State sovereign immu-
nity or violate any constitutional provision).
10 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing Congress with the "[plower... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"); see
also United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002) ("It would be more accurate to
speak of the 'Interstate Commerce Clause,' because the phrase 'Commerce Clause' wrongly
ignores the distinction between interstate and instrastate commerce.").
12 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (challenging 18 U.S.C. § 844(i),
criminalizing arson); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (challenging the Violence
Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13981); Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (challenging provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531); United States
v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5"h Cit. 2002) (challenging provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7401); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenging the criminalizing of the
manufacture of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125 (6th
Cir. 1996) (challenging the federal anti-car jacking statute); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101
(2d Cir. 1996) (challenging the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting).
14 See Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132; McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114.
15 This relatively benign restriction on congressional authority respects the decisions of a
coordinate branch of Government, and invalidates a congressional enactment "only upon a plain
showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
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legitimate exercise of federal power.16 By contrast, the more severe
facial challenge requires the court to "take the statute head on,"17 and
invalidate the unconstitutional law in every case. The one is a whit-
tling knife, the other a broad sword. However attractive the as-
applied challenge may be, courts nevertheless lack the power "to ex-
cise, as trivial, individual instances falling within a rationally defined
class of activities. 1 8 This Note contends that the structure and text of
the Constitution's grant of the Commerce Clause authority proscribes
as-applied challenges to commerce-based statutes, and requires an
essentially two-pronged facial analysis to determine first, whether the
class of activity is constitutionally regulable, and second, whether the
petitioner is a member of the regulated class.
Part I provides a brief background on Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence and proposes that the constitutional structure of the Commerce
Clause demands facial and not as-applied challenges to commerce-
based laws. Part II discusses facial and as-applied challenges gener-
ally, while Part III discusses three federal commerce-based statutes
and their legal challenges, and proposes a two-pronged test for courts
to use in analyzing these claims. In conclusion, Part IV addresses a
chief policy concern with adopting the facial test proposed, and sug-
gests a remedy that may alleviate the harsher realities of the Hobson's
choice implicit in Commerce Clause adjudication.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY: FROM FRAMERS TO FARMERS TO FELONS
Federalism was our Nation's own discovery.
The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.
- Justice Anthony Kennedy
19
To begin with "first principles, 2° the Constitution creates a federal
government-and a Congress in particular-of limited and enumer-
ated powers. 2 1 Article I vests in Congress "[aill legislative Powersherein granted,, 22 which implies that some legislative powers remain
16 See McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1133 (Trott, J., dissenting) (noting the difference between tak-
ing a statute "head on" and "carv[ing] pieces out of it").
17 Id.
is Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968).
19 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995).
20 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
21 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature
are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution
is written."); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187 (1824) (noting that the
Constitution "contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their gov-
ernment").
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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beyond Congress's reach,23 namely, the general police power, denied
to the federal government and reserved for the states. 24 The Framers
designed this constitutional division of State and federal authority to
protect our fundamental liberties, much as the separation and inde-
pendence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government pre-
vent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch.25 Thus,
the Founders "repeatedly rejected unlimited national power and em-
phasized that the delegated powers of the national government were
specifically enumerated in the Constitution," condemning a sweeping
congressional police power that they feared would lead again to tyr-
anny.26 This was the nature of constitutional federalism.
27
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes. 28 From the beginning of judicial review, the Su-
preme Court has struggled to define the edges of that power.29 In its
well-documented history of the Commerce Clause, Lopez made clear
that from very early on, the commerce power has been recognized as
the power to regulate, or "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is
to be governed., 30 The seminal Gibbons v. Ogden decision, expound-
ing on the language of the Commerce Clause, observed that the limits
of the power lie within the text, so that "commerce, which is com-
pletely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State,
23 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
24 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 & n.8 (2000).
2 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("In a
single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a
single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate powers.").
26 Anna Johnson Cramer, Note, The Right Results for All the Wrong Reasons: An Histori-
cal and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REV. 271, 276 (2000).
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madi-
son wrote:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each sub-
divided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to
the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the
same time that each will be controlled by itself.
Id.
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For a thorough analysis of the original grant of power, see
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 146
(2001), where it is argued that the Commerce Clause originally had a narrow meaning under
which "Commerce" meant "the trade or exchange of goods," "among the several States" meant
"between persons of one state and another," and "To regulate" meant "to specify how an activ-
ity may be transacted." See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that "[alt the time the original Constitution was ratified, 'commerce'
consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes").
29 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-91 (1824); United States v.
Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 78-81 (1838).
30 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196).
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or between different parts of the same State, and which does not ex-
tend to or affect other States, 31 lies beyond the reach of the commerce
power. Moreover, Gibbons noted that the Clause's "enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclu-
sively internal commerce of a State."32  That long-held distinction
between what is truly national and what is merely local was reviewed
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,33 in which the Supreme
Court broadened Congress's commerce power significantly 34 while
warning that the power may not extend so far as to "obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government." 35
As the New Deal-era unfolded, that distinction blurred, and in
United States v. Darby36 the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and in so doing found that Congress's commerce power reached
intrastate activities which so affect interstate commerce as to make
their regulation an appropriate means of regulating interstate com-
merce.37 Wickard v. Filburn,38 now widely regarded as "the high-
water mark of the New Deal's constitutional revolution, ' 39 followed
Darby in 1942. In Wickard, the Supreme Court unanimously deter-
mined that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 "extend[ed] fed-
eral regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce
but wholly for consumption on the farm."4 Implementing the aggre-
gation principle, whereby intrastate activity may be "taken together"
and thus found to "substantial[ly] influence" market conditions and
interstate commerce,41 Wickard "helped build a Commerce Clause
consensus that emerged over the entire course of the New Deal: 'If it
is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how
local the operation which applies the squeeze."'
42
31 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
32 Id. at 195.
33 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
34 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (tracing the expansion of the commerce power).
35 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37.
36 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
37 See id. at 118.
38 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
39 Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1719, 1747 (2003); see also Lopez, 514
U.S. at 560 (designating Wickard v. Filburn as "perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity").
40 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118.
41 See id. at 128.
42 Chen, supra note 39, at 1745 (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass n,
336 U.S. 460,464 (1949)).
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Despite the historical preference for distinguishing national and
local police power,43 that preference waned during the New Deal-era
as commerce forged a national economy and modem transportation
created the demand for national regulation. 44 The Supreme Court
soon developed a pragmatic perception of the commerce power45 that
seemed to recognize the Commerce Clause as "a complete grant of
power'4 6 allowing Congress to pass commerce-based criminal and
regulatory statutes almost at will.47 Judicial review of these statutes
had become little more than a formality,48 with the courts treating the
Commerce Clause as the "Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like
Clause, ' 49 leading Professor David Currie to surmise that, without
any judicially enforceable limits on Congress's Commerce Clause
power, "constitutional federalism had died."5°
Having such broad regulatory authority under the Commerce
Clause,51 it became the province of Congress to declare that an entire
43 See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (noting that "[s]tates possess primary au-
thority for defining and enforcing the criminal law"); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion) ("Under our federal system the administration of criminal
justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated
powers, has created offenses against the United States."); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 618 (2000). In Morrison, the Court declared:
The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the in-
strumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been
the province of the States. Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police
power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the
States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.
Id. (citations omitted)
44 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 802-03 (1996) (tracing Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
45 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995).
46 See RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 394 (2d ed. 1992).
47 See Earl M. Maltz, The Impact of the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 on the Dormant
Commerce Clause--A Case Study in the Decline of State Autonomy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
121, 129 (1995) ("In the wake of Jones & Laughlin and Wickard, it has become clear that under
post-1937 analysis, Congress has authority to regulate virtually all private economic activity.").
Furthermore, "[b]y the early 1970s, Congress had begun relying on the commerce power for all
manners of federal criminal legislation." Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings
and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55
ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1257 n.25 (2003).
48 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 316 (2d ed. 1988).
49 Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5
(1995). As Brannon Denning and Glenn Reynolds have described it, "the Commerce Clause
had become an 'intellectual joke,' a sort of get-out-of-court-free card good for virtually any
piece of federal legislation." Denning & Reynolds, supra note 47, at 1257.
50 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY 1888-1986 238 (1990).
51 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. The Court noted:
Jones & Laughlin Steel, Darby, and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of
Congress under [the Commerce] Clause. In part, this was a recognition of the
great changes... in the way business was carried on in this country .... But
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52class of activities affects commerce. Thus, the Supreme Court has
explained that the only question for the courts is whether the class is
within the federal reach.53 Wirtz explained that, in the Commerce
Clause context, courts are not empowered to "excise, as trivial, indi-
vidual instances falling within a rationally defined class of activi-
ties."54 The Court followed Wirtz three years later in Perez v. United
States55 with an additional reminder of the judiciary's role in review-
ing federal commerce statutes, adding emphasis to note that Darby
had decided that "a class of activities was held properly regulated by
Congress. 56  Perez applied Darby to its own criminal prosecution
and emphasized that the "[p]etitioner is clearly a member of the class
... as defined by Congress and the description of that class has the
required definiteness. 57 It then explained that in the landmark civil
rights decisions, Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States and Katzen-
bach v. McClung, which challenged the constitutional validity of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, "[i]t was the 'class of activities' test which
we employed . .. to sustain an Act of Congress requiring hotel or
motel accommodations for Negro guests. 58 Moreover, Justice Doug-
las wrote, "[iln emphasis of our position that it was the class of activi-
ties regulated that was the measure, we acknowledged that Congress
appropriately considered the 'total incidence' of the practice on com-
merce.' ' 59 Should any doubt remain, Perez affirmed Wirtz's declara-
tion that "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power 'to ex-
cise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." 60
Over twenty years later, Lopez61 and Morrison62 provided the
courts with guiding tests for determining whether a regulated activity
'substantially affects' interstate commerce.63 They did not disturb,
the doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases
artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
Id.
52 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968).
53 Id.; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941).
5 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193.
55 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
56 Id. at 152.
57 Id. at 153.
58 Id. (discussing, in particular, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964)).
59 Id. at 154 (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964)).
6 Id.
61 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
62 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
63 See id. at 598-99.
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however, the underlying principle that the power to regulate com-
merce is the power to govern a class of activity-and thus, the rela-
tive significance of footnote 27 articulated in Maryland v. Wirtz and
reiterated in Lopez.64 Because courts cannot excise the trivial and
individual instances within a rationally defined and regulated class,
those instances remain "of no consequence" to the Court.65
In United States v. Lopez, the Court departed from its laissez faire
interpretation of congressional Commerce Clause jurisdiction and
struck down66 the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it
a federal offense for anyone to possess a firearm in a school zone.67
The Court held that the Act exceeded congressional authority, and
that the time had come to restrict Congress's use of the commerce
power.68 Writing for the 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
counted the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and deter-
mined that the Court would not "convert congressional authority un-
der the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort re-
tained by the States... To do so would require us to conclude that the
Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something
not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between
64 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197 n.27).
65 Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 197 n.27.
66 See Robert F. Nagel, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez: The Future of
Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 644 (1996) (claiming that Lopez was "startling in
itself because it was the first decision in some five decades to define any limit to the meaning of
the phrase 'commerce among the states"'); see also Brickey, supra note 44, at 802-03 (1996)
(noting that "the Court accomplished this feat without expressly overruling any Commerce
Clause precedent"); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce By Another Name: The
Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 609
(2001) (arguing that "Lopez clearly marked a departure from the modem jurisprudential trend of
recognizing a broad grant of power to Congress under the Commerce Clause"). But see Glenn
H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme
Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Caine?, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 369, 378 (2000)
(noting that "Lopez can be interpreted in strong, weak, or symbolic fashion, or it can be dis-
missed as judicial frolic and detour, 'destined to be a "but see" citation' rather than 'a dramatic
shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence') [hereinafter Constitutional Revolution].
67 See Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
m See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. The Supreme Court concluded in relevant part:
To uphold the Government's contention here, we would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.
Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving
great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has
suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any
further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration
of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will
be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.
Id. (citations omitted).
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what is truly national and what is truly local., 69 And this, the Chief
Justice concluded, "we are unwilling to do."7
0
Under Lopez, the Court has recognized three broad categories of
activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause.7'
First, Congress may regulate the use of "the channels of interstate
commerce, ' 72 namely roads, railroads, water routes and airways.
Second, Congress is authorized "to regulate and protect the instru-
",73mentalities of interstate commerce. For example, Congress may
regulate and protect aircraft, boats and ships, trucks, and other high-
way vehicles.7 4 Finally, congressional commerce authority includes
"the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect in-
terstate commerce., 75  The Court firmly concluded that this third
category requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce,76 thereby requiring a "substan-
tial effect test., 77  Notable examples of activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce included restaurants utilizing substantial
interstate supplies, inns and hotels catering to interstate guests, as
well as the production and consumption of home-grown wheat.78
The Court followed Lopez five years later with United States v.
Morrison,79 striking down a provision of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA),80 which created a federal tort-based cause of
action for violent crime motivated by gender-based animus on the
69 Id.
70 Id. at 568.
71 Id. at 558.
72 Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) and United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
73 Id. at 558.
74 See Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). Perez offered the following explanation of the
three categories of commerce and their respective examples:
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. First, the
use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being
misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been
kidnaped [sic]. Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft, or persons or things in commerce, as
for example, thefts from interstate shipments. Third, those activities affecting com-
merce.
Id. (citations omitted).
75 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968))
(citations omitted).
76 Id. at 559.
77 United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 598 (5"h Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 914
(2003).
78 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-58 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111(1942), respectively).
79 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
80 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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grounds that the Commerce Clause authority did not extend to gen-
der-based violence.8' Morrison clarified the substantial effect test and
articulated what have become the four controlling factors for deter-
mining whether a regulated activity substantially affects interstate
commerce. 82  According to Morrison, courts will ask: first, whether
the statute in question regulates commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise; 83 second, whether the statute contains any express jurisdic-
tional element that might limit its reach to a discrete set of cases;
84
third, whether the statute or its legislative history contains express
congressional findings that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce; 85 and finally, whether the link between the regulated ac-
tivity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is attenuated.86
Looking to those four factors, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, struck down VAWA on its face, determining that intrastate,
gender-motivated crime does not substantially affect interstate com-
merce, and rejecting the position that Congress may regulate non-
economic "conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce. ' 87  It is important to keep in mind that Morri-
son's four factors do not provide a bright-line test, and an affirmative
or negative answer on any or all of the factors will not guarantee a
particular outcome; rather, they are factors the courts should consider
in determining whether a class of activity substantially affects inter-
state commerce.88
Overturning a commerce-based statute for the first time in nearly
six decades and revisiting the ground rules for federally regulating
interstate commerce did not go unnoticed. 89 As mentioned, Lopez and
81 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619. The Supreme Court also refused to uphold VAWA as
an exercise of Congress's remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
this Note is limited to the Court's Commerce Clause discussion. Id. at 619-27.
82 See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9t' Cir. 2003).
83 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610 (noting that "a fair reading of Lopez shows that the none-
conomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case").
84 Id. at 611-12 (noting that "a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is
in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce").
85 Id. at 612 ("[T]he existence of such findings may 'enable us to evaluate the legislative
judgment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye."' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563) (sec-
ond and third alterations in original)).
86 Id. at 612 (recalling that "our decision in Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link
between gun possession and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated").
87 Id. at 617. "Aggregate effect" considerations will be discussed in Part 11I, infra, of tiiis
Note.
88 See, e.g., id. at 615 (striking down the statute despite finding that VAWA had a legisla-
tive history with congressional findings showing that violence against women substantially
affected commerce).
89 As Brannon Denning and Glenn Reynolds noted, "literally hundreds of cases involving
a Lopez challenge had been decided between 1995 and 1999." Denning & Reynolds, supra note
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Morrison prompted a groundswell of litigation challenging an array
of federal statutes passed under Commerce Clause jurisdiction, 90 as
well as a host of symposia and articles analyzing the Court's "new"
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 91 Lopez made clear, however, that
the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence would not look
to the de minimis and peculiar instances of a petitioner's actions to
determine if her activity was constitutionally regulable. That is, the
Court will not hear a truly as-applied challenge to a commerce-based
statute, striking it down for the purposes of a single litigant. Thus,
petitioners are afforded a Hobson's choice-make the facial chal-
lenge, or make none.
II. FACIAL VS. As-APPLIED CHALLENGES:
HOW TO ATTACK THE LAW
But, unfortunately, law by no means confines itself
to its proper functions.
- Frederic Bastiat
92
Article I of the United States Constitution authorizes the federal
judiciary to resolve "cases and controversies" arising under, among
other things, the Constitution and federal law.93 There are two gener-
47, at 1254.
90 See, e.g., Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (challenging the
constitutionality of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.); United States v.
Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (11 th Cir. 2002), vacated by 369 F.3d 1238 (1 Ith Cir. 2004) (challeng-
ing the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 247); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d
589 (5th Cir. 2002) (challenging the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401); United States v. Cortes,
299 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2002) (challenging the Anti Car Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2119); United
States v. Wyatt, 64 Fed. Appx. 350 (4th Cir. 2002) (challenging the Child Pornography Preven-
tion Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996)
(challenging the criminalization of marijuana production, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); United States
v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125 (6th Cir. 1996) (challenging the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. §
371); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenging the Child Support Recov-
ery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.S. § 228).
91 See, e.g., Carl W. Chamberlin, Johnny Can't Read 'Cause Jane's Got a Gun: The Ef-
fects of Guns in Schools, and Options After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281 (1999);
Brent E. Newton, Felons, Firearms, and Federalism: Reconsidering Scarborough in Light of
Lopez, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 671 (2001); Constitutional Revolution, supra note 66, at
369; Symposium, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213
(2003); Symposium, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 635 (1996); Symposium, Federalism and the Criminal Justice System, 98 W. VA. L. REV.
815 (1996).
92 FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 8 (Dean Russel trans., The Foundation for Economic
Education 1990) (1850).
93 U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Minis-
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ally recognized ways to challenge a law within this framework: fa-
cially and as-applied. A typical challenge to a federal statute "alleges
only that its application to a particular plaintiff, in a particular situa-
tion, is unconstitutional., 94 This is the as-applied challenge; and, to
be successful, the plaintiff must establish that the statute is unconsti-
tutional with respect, or "as-applied," to him.95 Upon such a showing,
an as-applied challenge typically results in the court ordering the gov-
ernment not to apply the law to the petitioner's conduct.96  On the
other hand, to succeed in a facial attack, "the challenger must estab-
lish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid" 97-an onerous burden, making it "the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully. '98 As Stuart Buck has framed it, facial chal-
lenges allow the court to order the government "not to apply the law
to anyone ever again."
99
As mentioned above, as-applied challenges are the traditional and
even preferred challenges to federal statutes, with the facial challenge
considered a rare and suspect breed.1l° Hearing most challenges as-
applied rather than facially allows the courts to limit the scope of
congressional statutes without violating the principle that a "federal
court should not extend its invalidation of a statute further than neces-
sary to dispose of the case before it."'' 1 Thus, the Supreme Court has
largely regarded facial invalidation as "'manifestly strong medicine'
that 'has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last
resort."
102
ters and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controver-
sies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or
more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of dif-
ferent States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of dif-
ferent States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
Id.
94 Stuart Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to Do About Statutory Challenges, 55 ADMIN.
L. REV. 427,430 (2003).
95 See Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 544-45 (1914) (requiring that a
plaintiff show that the alleged constitutional feature injured him in order to strike down a state
law as unconstitutional).
96 See Buck, supra note 94, at 430-3 1.
97 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
98 Id.
99 Buck, supra note 94, at 431.
100See Fallon, supra note 7, at 1321 (recognizing "the normal if not exclusive mode of
constitutional adjudication involves an as-applied challenge").
101 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985). Professor Fallon has ar-
gued that "[t]he rationale for allowing statutes to be challenged only as applied resides largely in
the notions that statutory meaning frequently emerges best through case-by-case specification."
Fallon, supra note 7, at 1344.
102 Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (quoting Broadrick
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There is, however, a second way to constitutionally challenge a
statute "on its face." In limited contexts, litigants can argue that a
statute is "overbroad;" that is, that the statute prohibits such a broad
range of constitutionally protected activity that the statute is unconsti-
tutional.10 3  The "overbreadth doctrine," as it is customarily called,
allows a challenger to demonstrate that the law, as written, cannot be
constitutionally applied in a substantial number of instances. °4 In
effect, the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the otherwise firm
rule that a petitioner must only assert his or her own rights, and not
those of a third party. 0 5 In the words of the Court, usually "a person
to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be ap-
plied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the
Court." 10 6  Significantly, the Supreme Court does not recognize the
overbreadth doctrine beyond the limited context of the First Amend-
ment. t0 7  Thus, absent a First Amendment claim, petitioners will be
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)). See also, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52-53
(1971) explaining that
[t]he power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is in the final
analysis derived from its responsibility for resolving concrete disputes brought be-
fore the courts for decision; a statute apparently governing a dispute cannot be ap-
plied by judges, consistently with their obligations under the Supremacy Clause,
when such an application of the statute would conflict with the Constitution. But this
vital responsibility, broad as it is, does not amount to an unlimited power to survey
the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the courts are called upon to en-
force them. Ever since the Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal for having
members of the Supreme Court render advice concerning pending legislation it has
been clear that, even when suits of this kind involve a "case or controversy" suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of Article 1II of the Constitution, the task of analyz-
ing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task
for the judiciary.
103 Buck, supra note 94, at 441. Buck has noted that "[tihe overbreadth doctrine can be
traced to Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), a case involving the free speech rights of
picketers. Though the overbreadth doctrine is usually associated with speech cases, it has been
used in freedom of association cases as well." Id. at 431 n.16.
104See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982).
105 Buck, supra note 94, at 442.
106Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610.
107 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). As Stuart Buck has observed, "[i]f
all facial challenges fell into the overbreadth model, then the third-party standing rule would
never apply to facial challenges-an even more anomalous result." Buck, supra note 94, at 442.
Buck also notes, however, that
[a] doctrine parallel to that of First Amendment overbreadth has emerged in the abor-
tion context as well. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992), a plurality of the Court held that an abortion law is facially un-
constitutional if "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion."
Id. at 432 (second alteration in original).
2004]TURNING THE COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGE "ON ITS FACE" 175
barred from challenging Commerce Clause regulations on over-
breadth grounds, and will be obliged to convince the court that the
regulations cannot be enforced constitutionally under any set of cir-
cumstances. 1
08
Despite the relatively plain and defined roles of facial and as-
applied challenges, Professor Richard Fallon has remarked that "a
debate rages over when litigants should be able to challenge statutes
as 'facially' invalid, rather than merely invalid 'as applied. ' ' 10 9  For
example, Michael Doff has argued that the facial challenge is far
more common than its "rare and scarce" reputation would lead us to
believe. 1 Matthew Adler has gone so far as to suggest that there are
no true as-applied constitutional challenges,"' while Professor Fallon
has declared that the facial versus as-applied distinction is really a
false dichotomy, because "[a]ll challenges to statutes arise when a
litigant claims that a statute cannot be enforced against her."' 1 2
The debate extends to the Supreme Court, with lively exchanges
between Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia that have led Professor
Fallon to wonder whether "the Justices of the Supreme Court are not
only divided, but also conflicted or even confused" about when stat-
utes should be subject to a facial challenge." 3  Dissenting from the
City of Chicago v. Morales 14 plurality, for example, Justice Scalia
frowned upon facial challenges altogether, arguing that Marbury v.
Madison' only allows the courts to review laws as "applied to this
108 See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
109 Fallon, supra note 7, at 1321.
"
0 See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 235, 269 (1994) (arguing that the overbreadth doctrine generally extends to all "nonlitiga-
tion fundamental rights").
I Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitu-
tional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 157 (1998). Professor Adler argues that
[t]here is no such thing as a true as-applied constitutional challenge. The very idea is
a mistake. Until we get rid of that idea, our doctrines for adjudicating facial chal-
lenges will remain confused. The concept of unconstitutionality does not attach to
the treatment of particular litigants; it attaches . . . to the enactment of statutes and
other rules. Salerno conceives of the facial invalidity of a rule as the limiting point
of as-applied invalidity: a rule is facially invalid if, for every application of the rule,
that application is constitutionally invalid. Justice O'Connor, in her response to
Salerno, tries to soften the test somewhat: a rule is facially invalid if, for many appli-
cations of the rule, those are constitutionally invalid. But both tests are mistaken,
because both trade upon the mistaken, albeit standard, notion that rule-applications
can be properly described as unconstitutional.
Id. (emphasis omitted).112 Fallon, supra note 7, at 1321; see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 78 n. 1,(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that outside of the First Amendment "overbreadth" cases,
"a facial attack, since it requires unconstitutionality in all circumstances, necessarily presumes
that the litigant presently before the court would be able to sustain an as-applied challenge").
113 Fallon, supra note 7, at 1323 (noting the Justices' lengthy debate in Morales).
114527 U.S. 41(1999).
1155 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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party, in the circumstances of this case."' 1 6 Justice Scalia went on to
argue:
It seems to me fundamentally incompatible with this system
for the Court not to be content to find that a statute is uncon-
stitutional as applied to the person before it, but to go further
and pronounce that the statute is unconstitutional in all appli-
cations .... I think it quite improper, in short, to ask the con-
stitutional claimant before us: Do you just want us to say that
this statute cannot constitutionally be applied to you in this
case, or do you want to go for broke and try to get the statute
pronounced void in all its applications?' 
17
Until recently, this debate had not directly addressed the particular
question of whether the as-applied challenge is in fact appropriate for
Commerce Clause statutes,118 or whether, in the Commerce Clause
context, the claimant may only choose "the horse closest to the stable
doors," and thus, "go for broke."
A proper challenge to a Commerce Clause statute asks the court to
determine whether Congress has authority to regulate a class of activ-
ity that Congress has already determined substantially affects inter-
state commerce. 9  This is the classic facial challenge. The as-
applied challenger, however, asks the court a different question-
namely, is the regulation constitutional as applied to the particular and
peculiar facts of my case? An as-applied challenge asks the court to
consider the de minimis character of individual instances-a consid-
116 Morales, 527 U.S. at 74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The fuller context of Justice Scalia's
argument is as follows:
The rationale for our power to review federal legislation for constitutionality, ex-
pressed in Marbury v. Madison, was that we had to do so in order to decide the case
before us. But that rationale only extends so far as to require us to determine that the
statute is unconstitutional as applied to this party, in the circumstances of this case.
Id. (citation omitted).
1 7 Id. at 77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118 This debate was taken up directly in United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.
2003) and United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) in 2003. See also Rancho
Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("The panel's
opinion in effect asks whether the challenged regulation substantially affects interstate com-
merce, rather than whether the activity being regulated does so ... Such an approach seems
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings in United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison.") (citations omitted).
119 See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968) (noting "[the only question for
the courts is then whether the class is 'within the reach of the federal power"' (emphasis added)
(quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-121(1940)); see also GDF Realty Invs. v.
Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 633 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that "consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Commerce Clause, we conclude that the scope of inquiry is primarily
whether the expressly regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce").
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eration the Supreme Court has said it will not make. 20 But a closer
look at the as-applied Commerce Clause challenge reveals that the
litigant might actually be asking the court one of two questions which
are generally not "as-applied" questions-perhaps without realizing
it.
An as-applied litigant in the Commerce Clause context generally
asks either whether Congress can in fact constitutionally regulate the
litigant's class of activity; or, whether the particular, de minimis con-
duct in question falls within the scope of the statute or regulation.
The first question, however, is simply another way of asking whether
the statute is constitutional on its face; and the second question
merely asks whether the statute prohibits the party's alleged conduct.
Neither of these questions should be separately classified as appropri-
ate, "as-applied" constitutional challenges. Instead, either they should
be recognized, in the first instance, as mounting a facial challenge to
the statute's constitutionality or, they should be seen in the second
instance as raising no constitutional challenge at all, asking merely
whether the litigant has violated the statute. Regardless of how the
claim is constructed, because the Commerce Clause authorizes Con-
gress to regulate a class of activity from which the de minimis in-
stances are not excluded, a constitutional challenge to congressional
Commerce power must ask whether the class of activity Congress has
regulated falls within the scope of its authority. To ask any other
question is not to bring a proper constitutional challenge; in Hobson's
terms, it seeks to rent a tired horse.
III. APPLYING THE CLASS OF ACTivrrIEs TEST:
PORN, GUNS, AND Ho
[Clongressional legislation under the Commerce Clause
always will engender "legal uncertainty."
- Chief Justice William Rehnquist
121
While a multitude of commerce-based statutes have been constitu-
tionally challenged following the Lopez and Morrison decisions, a
closer look at how Lopez approached the facts before it, and then an
analysis of three Commerce Clause statutes and their respective litiga-
tion, may help illustrate the effect of requiring facial challenges to
Commerce Clause laws. This Part considers this proposal in the con-
text of constitutional challenges to child pornography, firearms, and
asbestos removal laws.
120 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995).
121 id. at 566.
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A. The Lopez Approach
The Supreme Court's handling of the challenge presented in
United States v. Lopez 122 is particularly instructive. Alfonso Lopez
provided the Court with an ideal opportunity to take an as-applied
approach to a Commerce Clause statute and find the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990123 unconstitutional only as-applied to the peti-
tioner, and thereby avoid the broader constitutional question. Under
the respected theory of constitutional avoidance the Court will not
"decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely neces-
sary to a decision of the case."' 24 If the Court could have read the
Gun-Free School Zones Act so as to uphold its constitutionality, it
would have done so.' 25 But the Court approached the Act facially and
struck it down-a significant decision given the theory of constitu-
tional avoidance and the Court's presumption that a statute is consti-
tutional12 6 until "a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its con-
stitutional bounds."'
' 27
The facts in Lopez, recounted by the Fifth Circuit on appeal, sug-
gest that if the Supreme Court had considered the de minimis facts of
Alfonso Lopez's case relevant to deciding the case, the statute very
122 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
123 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2000).
124 Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905); see also United States v. Raines,
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (noting that courts typically avoid "a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied" (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. &
Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33,39 (1885))).
125 That the Court would have avoided the broader constitutional question in Lopez admit-
tedly presumes that the Justices would have followed Justice Brennan's opinion for a unanimous
Court in United States v. Raines:
The very foundation of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress
unconstitutional lies in the power and duty of those courts to decide cases and con-
troversies properly before them .... This Court, as is the case with all federal courts,
"has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a State or of the United States,
void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to ad-
judge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies. In the exercise of that juris-
diction, it is bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly adhered, one, never
to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Kindred to these rules is the rule
that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional ....
The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be
exercised with reference to hypothetical cases thus imagined.
362 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1960) (citations omitted).
126 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (noting the "presumption of
constitutionality" afforded federal statutes).
127 Id.
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well could have survived the constitutional challenge. The Fifth Cir-
cuit summarized the facts in Lopez as follows:
On March 10, 1992, . . Alfonso Lopez, Jr., then a twelfth-
grade student attending Edison High School in San Antonio,
Texas, arrived at school carrying a concealed .38 caliber
handgun. Based upon an anonymous tip, school officials
confronted Lopez, who admitted that he was carrying the
weapon. Although the gun was unloaded, Lopez had five
bullets on his person. After being advised of his rights, Lopez
stated that "Gilbert" had given him the gun so that he (Lopez)
could deliver it after school to "Jason," who planned to use it
in a "gang war." Lopez was to receive $40 for his services. 12 8
Upon arrest, Lopez was charged with violating the Gun-Free Schools
Zone Act, 129 which made it illegal to possess a firearm in a school
zone. 130
Significantly, Alfonso Lopez not only possessed a firearm in a
school zone, he was engaged as a courier in the sale of a handgun,
and was thus involved in an obviously commercial activity likely
considered constitutionally regulable. Of even greater significance,
however, is that the Court did not look to the peculiar, de minimis
character of this gun-running actor; rather, it addressed whether the
class of activity regulated by the statute was within Congress's com-
merce power.' 3 ' As the Fifth Circuit explained in GDF Realty v. Nor-
ton,132 had Lopez looked at the commercial nature of Alfonso Lopez's
gun-trafficking behavior, the facial challenge would have failed. 33
But Lopez looked only to the activity expressly regulated by the stat-
ute, and because the class of activity regulated under the Act was gun
possession, and not gun trafficking, the fact that Alfonso Lopez was a
gun courier involved in a gun sale at the time of his arrest was wholly
irrelevant to the Court's consideration. 34 Thus, Lopez not only in-
128 United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
129 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000).
13 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345. A "school zone" was defined as "in, or on the grounds of, a pub-
lic, parochial or private school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public,
parochial or private school." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 n. 1 (1995).
131 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (holding that "the Act exceeds the authority of Congress
'[tlo regulate Commerce... among the several States" and affirming the Fifth Circuit's position
that "section 922(q), in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause") (alterations in original).
132 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
1
33 Id. at 635.
134 As the Fifth Circuit stated in Norton, "[n]either the plain language of the Commerce
Clause, nor judicial decisions construing it, suggest that, concerning substantial effect vel non,
Congress may regulate activity ... solely because non-regulated conduct ... by the actor en-
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voked the language from Wirtz's footnote 27 denouncing the de
minimis characteristics of a case, it also provided a clear example for
resolving constitutional challenges to commerce-based statutes: look
only to whether the regulated class of activity substantially affects
interstate commerce-that is, look to the statute on its face-and then
determine if the claimant is a member of that class. 135
Notwithstanding the Lopez example, lower courts continue to en-
tertain as-applied challenges to Commerce Clause statutes, 36 whit-
tling away the de minimis activities from the broader, constitutional
regulations. Such cases, as discussed below, have included federal
child-pornography statutes,137 firearms laws, 38 and the asbestos re-
moval and notice requirements of the Clean Air Act.'
39
B. Child Pornography: The Protection of Children from Sexual
Predators Act
A recent line of cases has cast doubt on the constitutionality of
Congress's Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998
(the "Act"),140 a federal statute prohibiting the possession of one or
more sexually explicit depictions of a minor.' 41 The statute prohibits
anyone from
(B) knowingly possess[ing] 1 or more books, magazines, pe-
riodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain
any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been
shipped or transported in inter-state or foreign commerce, or
gaged in the regulated activity will have some connection to interstate commerce." Id. at 634.
135 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
136 E.g., Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (challenging provisions
of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, et seq. (2000)); United States v. Ho, 311
F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002) (challenging provisions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401, et seq.
(2000)); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001) (challenging anti-child pornogra-
phy provisions); Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenging 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) criminalizing the manufacture of marijuana); United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d 125
(6th Cir. 1996) (challenging the federal anti-car jacking statute); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d
101 (2d Cir. 1996) (challenging the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228
(2000)).
137 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000).
139 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2000).
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
14018 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000). See, e.g., United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83 (2d
Cir. 2003); United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. McCoy,
323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir.
1999); United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Robinson, 137
F.3d 652 (1st Cir. 1998).
141 See Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 226.
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which was produced using materials which have been mailed
or so shipped or transported, by any means including by
computer, if-
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-
duct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct. 142
In each of these recent cases, the statute was ruled facially constitu-
tional. Yet the Sixth and Ninth Circuits both found it unconstitutional
as applied to particular defendants. 143  The reasoning in these two
cases is particularly salient.
1. United States v. Corp
Patrick Corp, a twenty-three-year-old Michigan man, was arrested
after film developers at his local pharmacy became suspicious when
he asked them not to view the pictures and allegedly remarked "these
are sick" while dropping off the roll of film. 144 A police investigation
revealed that the photographs were pornographic shots of a young
girl, Sandra Sauntman, then a seventeen-year-old high school student
in Reed City.145  The pictures showed Corp's twenty-six-year-old
wife, Heather, engaging in sexual activity with Sandra. 46 The gov-
ernment did not allege that Corp distributed the photographs, or that
he ever invited others to observe the photographs, 47 moreover, it did
"not expect to show that Defendant intended or did distribute the im-
ages in question in interstate commerce.' ' 148 Indeed, Sandra testified
that she posed with Heather voluntarily, 149 and never expected anyone
else to even know about the photographs. 150 Despite the victim's
testimony and the "strictly personal" use of the photographs, Corp
142 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2000).
143 See United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (choosing "not to declare
the Act facially unconstitutional," but finding "that Corp's activity was not of a type demon-
strated substantially to be connected or related to interstate commerce on the facts of this case");
United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (ignoring the facial challenge and
holding only that "[tihe statute is unconstitutional as applied").
144 Corp, 236 F.3d at 326.
1
4 5 Id.
146/d
w Id.147 .
1
48 Id. at 326 n.4 (quoting from the government's brief opposing defendant's motion to dis-
miss).
149 Id. at 326.
'-'Id. at 326 n.5.
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was convicted under the Act and sentenced to five months imprison-
ment plus supervised release.'
5
'
On appeal, Corp argued that the statute was "unconstitutional on
its face because it exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause authority,
and it is also unconstitutional as applied in this case because this of-
fense does not have a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce."
152
The Sixth Circuit reversed Corp's conviction, finding the statute un-
constitutional as-applied, 153 and noting that although the Act raised
serious, constitutional, Commerce Clause questions, "we choose not
to declare the Act facially unconstitutional."1 54  In overturning the
decision below, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the trial court's observa-
tion that "the case is outside the heartland of the statute which is in-
tended to punish people who engage in sexual abuse of minors."'
55
The court concluded that because Corp was not the typical offender
targeted by Congress,156 his actions lacked a "sufficient nexus with
interstate commerce"1 57 to apply the statute against him.
In effect, the Sixth Circuit determined that in order to be found
guilty of violating the Act, the government must prove that the defen-
dant was the "typical offender feared by Congress that would... per-
petuate the [child pornography] industry via interstate connec-
tions.' 58  How would the government demonstrate such a thing?
Corp provided an itemized list of questions for determining, on a
case-by-case basis, whether the activity substantially affects interstate
commerce.1 59 Remarkably, those questions include: "Were there mul-
tiple children so pictured? Were the children otherwise sexually
abused?"'16 The court did not explain how the answers to these ques-
tions provide a particularly accurate barometer for measuring the de-
fendant's activities' effect on interstate commerce.' 61 What is clear,
however, is that Patrick Corp's conviction was overturned because, in
the Sixth Circuit's estimation, his conduct fell outside the intended
scope of the statute. Put another way, Corp did not violate the law.
I' Id. at 327.
152 Id. at 325.
15 3 Id.
154 Id. at 332.
15 Id. at 327. The Sixth Circuit went so far as to say "Sauntman was not an 'exploited
child' nor a victim in any real and practical sense in this case." Id. at 332.
156 Id. at 333.
157 Id.
158 Id.
15 9 Id.
16°d. It is unclear whether these questions effectively add elements to the offense.
161 More helpful for determining "a substantial effect on commerce" would be whether the
defendant was in fact involved or intended to be involved in distributing the pictures to others,
particularly in other states. The court acknowledges that this was not the case, but then omits
these considerations from its list of "relevant" questions. See id. at 332-333.
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Thus, in asking whether Corp was a "typical offender" whose ac-
tivity is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce, 162 the court merely
asked whether Corp broke the law. But, as Lopez demonstrated, this
question is entirely irrelevant for determining the constitutionality of
a commerce-based statute. 163 Asking whether the defendant did any-
thing prohibited by the statute is not a constitutional question. An-
swering that question is necessary, of course, for sustaining a convic-
tion and applying the weight of the law to the claimant; but mounting
a constitutional challenge to a Commerce Clause statute first requires
the court to determine "whether the class is 'within the reach of the
federal power.''64 Then, where the class of activities is constitution-
ally regulated, "the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, indi-
vidual instances' of the class."'165 Failing to ask the appropriate ques-
tion, Corp demonstrates how courts perform just such a surgical exci-
sion. 166
2. United States v. McCoy
As the Ninth Circuit told the story, Rhonda and Jonathan McCoy
were at home dying Easter eggs with their ten-year old daughter,
Kala, when "[a]t some point during the evening, Rhonda and Kala,
partially unclothed, posed side by side for [Jonathan's] camera, with
their genital areas exposed. This pose was captured in one photo-
graph."'
167
Rhonda McCoy was subsequently charged 168 under the Act for
possession of a single piece of child pornography. The district court
162 Id. at 333.
163 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
164 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 120-121(1941)) (emphasis added).
165 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (quoting Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193).
1
6 6 But see Dean C. Seman, Comment, United States v. Corp: Where to Draw the Interstate
Line on Congress' Commerce Clause Authority to Regulate Intrastate Possession of Child
Pornography, 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 181 (2002). Seman agreed with the Sixth Circuit's
analysis and decision, arguing:
The Sixth Circuit, in Corp, reached the correct decision by evaluating the defen-
dant's behavior and personal impact on the national child pornography market in
light of the Lopez factors framework. This approach applies the same judicial review
requiring a rational connection between the interstate activity and interstate affect,
however does not apply the strict Wickard market theory. Instead, this approach
properly focuses on the defendant's conduct on a "case-by-case basis." . . . This ap-
proach also guarantees the defendant's conduct falls within the permissible Lopez
factors, specifically, a commercial and economic activity.
Id. at 206-07.
167 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1115 (9th Cir. 2003).
'a Id. at 1116. According to McCoy:
The government filed an indictment charging both Jonathan and Rhonda with four
counts of manufacturing child pornography by a parent using materials transported in
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denied her motion to dismiss, and McCoy appealed, arguing that the
statute was both "on its face and as applied,... an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power." 169
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled the statute unconstitutional "as
applied to McCoy and others similarly situated."' 70  Writing for the
majority, Judge Stephen Reinhardt declined to determine whether the
statute was facially constitutional, leaving that question for the Cir-
cuit's Judge Tallman to answer just six months later.17' As the Ninth
Circuit explained in United States v. Adams, 172 the McCoy panel con-
ducted an as-applied analysis of the Act in determining that "home-
grown child pornography intended for personal use did not influence,
in any way, the national market for child pornography."' 173 Judge
Reinhardt's opinion emphasized that McCoy's photograph "never
entered in and was never intended for interstate or foreign com-
merce."174 The McCoy court held that applying the Act to the intra-
state possession of a photograph that "has not been mailed, shipped,
or transported interstate and is not intended for interstate distribution
or for economic or commercial use ... cannot be justified under the
Commerce Clause."'
75
Rhonda McCoy, like Patrick Corp, 176 would seem an ideal candi-
date for waging an as-applied challenge to the Protection of Children
from Sexual Predators Act. She possessed but one compromising
photo of her own daughter without any intention of displaying or dis-
tributing the picture, and did not exacerbate the growing problem of
interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b) .... Rhonda and Jonathan filed motions to
dismiss the indictment, which the district court denied on May 10, 2001. Rhonda
then entered plea negotiations with the government, while Jonathan elected to stand
trial. He was eventually acquitted by a jury on all counts on June 13, 2001.
Id. 169 1d. at 1116-1117.
170Id. at 1133.
171 See United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d. 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.
Ct. 2871 (2004). The court began:
In United States v. McCoy, we entertained an "as-applied" constitutional challenge to
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and held that Congress lacks the power under the Com-
merce Clause to criminalize the "simple intrastate possession of home-grown child
pornography not intended for distribution or exchange." Now we must answer the
question left undecided in McCoy: whether 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), on its face, is
an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power. We hold that it is not.
Id. (citations omitted).
172 343 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
173 Id. at 1028-29.
174McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1132.
1751d. at 1133.
176 See id. at 1131 (noting that McCoy's circumstances were similar to those in United
States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001)).
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interstate child pornography trafficking. 77  Yet an as-applied chal-
lenge, even here, was inappropriate.
As Judge Stephen Trott wrote in dissent, by trying to avoid decid-
ing whether § 2252(a)(4)(B) of the Act is facially unconstitutional,
the McCoy majority "attempted to restrict their holding to McCoy and
to others 'similarly situated,' but it is not clear ... that the law per-
mits such a limitation.' ' | 78 Judge Trott argued, instead, that "the Su-
preme Court appears ... to have ruled out 'as applied' challenges in
Commerce Clause cases," 179 so that "if the conduct under review falls
within the plain language of the statute, precedent requires us to take
the statute head on, not carve pieces out of it."' 8 ° In Judge Trott's
view, "[t]he real determinative question is whether the activity gen-
erically described in the statute has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce such that it is subject to criminalization by Congress."'' 8'
This perspective is much closer to the "class of activities" test as an-
nounced in Perez. 82  In contrast to the significance that Judge
Reinhardt afforded McCoy's singular "home-grown" photograph that
was never intended for interstate or foreign commerce, 83 Judge Trott
contended that because Congress has found that an entire class of
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, "[tio the statute, it
is immaterial that the particular child pornography under scrutiny was
not produced for sale or trade."' 84 What is material, is the determina-
tion that "(1) her conduct falls within the purview of the statute, as
she has stipulated, and (2) the statute itself which covers the activity
is valid."'' 85 Thus, Judge Trott argued the as-applied challenge pre-
sents an inappropriate inquiry as "it is impossible to read McCoy out
of the statute.
' 18 6
177 1d. at 1132.
178 Id. at 1133 (Trott, J., dissenting).
1
79 Id.
180d. Judge Trott hinted at this analysis less than a year before McCoy in his majority
opinion in United States v. Cortes:
Here we decide whether a class of activity, i.e., caijacking, substantially affects in-
terstate commerce such that Congress may regulate it. Our inquiry closely parallels
the Supreme Court's inquiries in Lopez and Morrison: whether Congress could regu-
late certain gun possessions or gender-motivated crimes. Because we decide that
carjacking does substantially affect interstate commerce, Congress may regulate it in
its entirety. That a particular instance of carjacking may have a de minimis effect on
interstate commerce is of no consequence.
299 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1224 (2003).
181 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1134 (Trott, J., dissenting).
182 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152-54 (1971).
183 See McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1132.
184 Id. at 1141 (Trott, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 1135 (Trott, J., dissenting).
1861d. at 1140 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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Of greater significance, however, is Judge Trott's analysis of the
as-applied challenge at work in McCoy. As discussed above, Judge
Trott regarded "[t]he upshot of condemning the statute 'as
applied' . . . [as] either (1) tantamount to condemning the statute, hic
sepultus, on its face as overbroad, or (2) construing the statute
as... not covering intrastate non-commercial possession."'187 That is
to say, the as-applied challenge is either a facial challenge thinly
guised, or it merely asks if the defendant breached the terms of the
statute.
Judge Reinhardt argued that he did not decide the case "on the
idiosyncratic facts of an individual instance of de minimis charac-
ter." 188 Instead, wrote Judge Reinhardt, the majority interpreted the
statute "as applied to McCoy's conduct as it falls within a class of
activity that § 2252(a)(4)(B) purports to reach: intrastate possession of
a non-commercial and non-economic character.' 89 Asking, however,
whether Congress may regulate a "class of activity" is, in fact, the
essence of a facial challenge. 190 So, to the extent that McCoy looked
to the class of activity proscribed by the statute, it looked to whether
the statute was constitutional on its face. Any attempt to restrict the
finding of that inquiry to a particular defendant and others similarly
,,191
situated, has, as Judge Trott said, "exceeded what the law permits.
Notwithstanding their claims to the contrary, both the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits in Corp and McCoy attempted to restrict their findings
to the de minimis facts of a peculiar case. In the first instance, Corp
found only that Patrick Corp's behavior did not make him a feared
and typical offender-hardly a constitutional question. 192 In the sec-
ond case, McCoy held that Rhonda McCoy's conduct fell within a
class of activity lying beyond Congress's reach-a finding that should
have. invalidated the statute. 193 Neither case framed the Commerce
Clause analysis properly.
C. Firearms Possession in United States v. Stewart
Within months of deciding McCoy, the Ninth Circuit again heard a
constitutional challenge to Congress's commerce power in United
18
7 Id.
188 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1132.
189 Id.
190 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 120-21 (1941), and noting that "[tihe only question for the courts is then whether the class
is 'within the reach of the federal power"' (emphasis added)).
191 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1140 (Trott, J., dissenting).
192 United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
19 3 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1132.
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States v. Stewart.194 Robert Stewart appealed his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(o), which proscribes the transfer or possession of a ma-
chinegun by a felon. 195 Stewart sold parts kits for manufacturing and
assembling .50 caliber rifles. After discovering that he had a prior
felony conviction for possession and transfer of a machinegun, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) investi-
gated Stewart's business and a warranted search of Stewart's resi-
dence revealed thirty-one firearms, including five machineguns. 196 Of
particular interest to the court, however, was the fact that these ma-
chineguns were "entirely homemade."' 197 As the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained, "[c]ontrary to [the] assumption that an unlawful transfer [of
firearms] must precede unlawful possession, Stewart did not acquire
his machineguns from someone else: He fabricated them himself." 198
The guns being "genuinely homemade,"' 99 the court determined that
Stewart's machineguns had not been in the channels of interstate
commerce, 200 and found no "inherent link to interstate commerce" 201
by which Congress could prohibit his possession. The court therefore
vacated the conviction under § 922(o),2°2 finding the statute unconsti-
tutional as-applied to Stewart.2 °3
'- 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (deciding this case Nov. 13, 2003, less than nine months
after McCoy).
195 See id. at 1134. "Stewart was charged and convicted of one count of felony possession
of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2), and five counts of unlawful
possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)." Stewart appealed on both
Commerce Clause and Second Amendment grounds. Id.
196 See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1133-1134.
197 See id. at 1135.
198 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1135. The court's detailed description of the peculiar nature of
Stewart's machineguns is as follows:
The government has never contested Stewart's claim that the machineguns were en-
tirely homemade, and the evidence supports his claim. The chief of the ATF Fire-
arms Technology Branch, referring to one of the machineguns, testified that it was "a
unique type of firearm." He explained that the machineguns were "based on
a.. . Sten gun design," which is a type of British machinegun, and had "certain [Sten
gun] parts," but "the rest of the parts. .. [were] not... conventional Sten gun parts.
He also testified that one of the machineguns had "some Sten gun parts on it, but
then it also ha[d] parts which [were] not original Sten gun parts." He continued:
"And I've seen many Sten guns assembled from Sten gun parts kits, but I had never
previously seen one that was assembled with these other parts on it." None of the
machineguns had original Sten receiver tubes (the part of the gun that houses the car-
tridge when the weapon is fired), and at least one was identified as having a "home-
made receiver tube." On some of the machineguns, the trigger was "quite different"
from "an ordinary Sten gun trigger." The ATF chief testified that "[tihe only time
[he'd] ever seen.., this [type of mechanism was] in conjunction with [a] .. . single-
shot rifle."
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
199Id. at 1136.
200 Id.
2
0
1 Id. at 1139.
202 Id. at 1142 (noting, however, that the court affirmed Stewart's conviction for possession
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The difficulty with Stewart's as-applied ruling is that it fails to ac-
count for the question the Commerce Clause presents: whether "an
entire class of activities affects commerce" 204 and is therefore regu-
lable by Congress. Without providing "any jurisdictional requirement
that the machinegun has traveled in or substantially affected interstate
commerce," 205 § 922(o) makes it illegal for a felon to "transfer or
possess a machinegun." 2 6 Thus, the class of activity at issue in Stew-
art was a felon's possession (or transfer) of a machinegun. Judge
Alex Kozinski, however, writing for the majority, set out to "decide
whether Congress can, under its Commerce Clause power, prohibit
the mere possession of homemade machineguns, 20 7 and "whether this
statute, as applied to Stewart, offends the Commerce Clause.,
20 8
Finding the statute unconstitutional only as-applied to Stewart, and
upholding it on its face,2 9 Judge Kozinski failed to follow the Lo-
pez/Wirtz example, and ruled on the obviously de minimis characteris-
tics of Stewart's peculiar position, rather than deciding whether Con-
gress can constitutionally regulate the class of activity reached by the
statute. The class of activity described by the statute is without ques-
tion the "transfer or possess[ion] of a machinegun.,, 2 10  The proper
constitutional inquiry, then, was whether the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the authority to proscribe the transfer or possession of ma-
chineguns by felons, and not whether Stewart's "genuinely home-
made" machineguns211 were regulable.
Because Stewart was a felon possessing machineguns, he clearly
fell within the statute's expressly regulated class of activity. Thus, he
could not, and did not, claim that his behavior fell outside the defined
scope of the statute. Instead, he was compelled to challenge the va-
lidity of Congress's regulation of machinegun possession; a challenge
that can only be described as facial. Understood this way, if the court
found that Congress can regulate the class of activity (i.e., a felon's
machinegun possession), then, because Stewart was a member of the
of firearms by a felon).
203 Id. at 1140. Stewart's Second Amendment challenge was rejected by the court, and his
conviction was reversed only because § 922 was "an unlawful extension of Congress's com-
merce power." Id. at 1142.
204 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968).
205 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1134.
2 6Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)).
207 Id. at 1133 (emphasis added).
208 1d. at 1134.
209 ld. at 1140 ("We therefore conclude that section 922(o) is unconstitutional as applied to
Stewart.").
21018 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2000).
211 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1136.
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designated class, the de minimis nature of his homemade machinegun
should have been irrelevant to the court's consideration. If, on the
other hand, the court determined that Congress can not regulate the
machinegun-possessing class because Congress failed to make the
required jurisdictional showings, under Lopez and Morrison, linking
possession to interstate commerce, then Congress exceeded its consti-
tutional commerce power and the statute should have been struck
down on its face, and not merely as applied to a particular defendant.
Judge Kozinski, however, took neither of these approaches.21 2 In-
stead, he agreed with Stewart's argument that despite being a member
of a statutorily defined class213 of machinegun-holders, Stewart's par-
ticular type of machinegun somehow exempted him from that regu-
lated class. Thus, Judge Kozinski effectively recognized a sub-class
of machinegun-holders mentioned nowhere in the statute, and he im-
properly parsed the statute, "excis[ing], as trivial' 2 14 petitioner Stew-
art's individual instance from a "rationally defined class of activi-
,,215
ties.
Following McCoy's discussion of the as-applied versus facial
Commerce Clause challenge by only a few months, Judge Kozinski
took up the McCoy debate in Part 3 of his opinion and directly ad-
dressed Judge Trott's dissenting and "superficially plausible argu-
ments ' 216 in McCoy. Judge Kozinski began his critique of the McCoy
212 The final language in the part of the Stewart opinion that summarizes the court's hold-
ing as to the defendant may in fact be imprecise and worth clarifying. Part 2 of the opinion
concludes: "Based on the four-factor Morrison test, section 922(o) cannot be viewed as having a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. We therefore conclude that section 922(o) is uncon-
stitutional as applied to Stewart." United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003).
It would be more precise to conclude that the regulated activity does or does not substan-
tially affect interstate commerce, as the effect of the statute or regulation itself is not the point at
issue. The Fifth Circuit has noted that "in analyzing the effect on interstate commerce, courts
look only to the expressly regulated activity." GDF Realty v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634 (5th
Cir. 2003). Additionally, in his Rancho Viejo v. Norton dissent from denial of rehearing en
banc, Judge Roberts of the D.C. Circuit contended that the court was wrong to have effectively
asked "whether the challenged regulation substantially affects interstate commerce, rather than
whether the activity being regulated does so .... Such an approach seems inconsistent with
the ... holdings in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison." Rancho Viejo v.
Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
It is unclear whether Stewart intended to comment on the effect of the regulation itself, but
such a determination would again have lost sight of the real Commerce Clause issue before the
court-whether the class of activity is regulable under the commerce power.
213 Recall the language in Perez v. United States: "[If the pletitioner is clearly a member of
the class... as defined by Congress and the description of that class has the required definite-
ness," then "[wihere the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of
federal power, the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class.
402 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1971).
214 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192 (1968).
2151Id.
216 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1140 (noting that "because the McCoy majority did not address the
dissent's superficially plausible arguments, we do so here").
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dissent by suggesting that the dissent's assertion that "as-applied chal-
lenges cannot be brought under the Commerce Clause" 217 relied
solely on a single sentence that Lopez borrowed from Wirtz:218 "where
a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce,
the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence.,
219
It is not the case, however, that a line plucked from Lopez is the
only support for the idea that as-applied challenges are inappropriate
for commerce-based statutes. The Supreme Court explained in detail
in Perez v. United States220 that the "class of activities" test 22' control-
ling interstate commerce cases was articulated in United States v.
Darby222 "[i]n passing on the validity of [Commerce Clause] legisla-
tion," and was then used in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States223
"to sustain an Act of Congress ...declar[ing] that 'any inn, hotel,
motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient
guests' affects commerce per se."224 As Perez further explained, the
"class of activities" test was employed again in Katzenbach v.
McClung225 where, "[in emphasis of our position that it was the class
of activities regulated that was the measure, we acknowledged that
Congress appropriately considered the 'total incidence' of the practice
on commerce. 226
While Stewart failed to acknowledge the Perez analysis affirming
the "class of activities test" for Commerce Clause adjudication, 227 it
did reference Heart of Atlanta, Katzenbach, and finally Wickard v.
Filburn as examples of cases in which the Supreme Court had "enter-
tained as-applied challenges under the Commerce Clause. 228 Judge
Kozinski argued that
217 United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting).
218 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1140.
219 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1134 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995))
(emphasis omitted).
220402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18
U.S.C. § 891, is a permissible exercise of the Commerce power). Perez followed Wirtz by only
three years.
221 Perez, 402 U.S. at 153.
222 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941) ("In passing on the validity of legislation of the class last
mentioned the only function of courts is to determine whether the particular activity regulated or
prohibited is within the reach of the federal power.").
223 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
224 Perez, 402 U.S. at 153 (quoting Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 247).
225 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
226 Perez, 402 U.S. at 154.
227 Stewart does not cite to Perez in its discussion of the "lack of support" for the dissent's
position in McCoy.
228 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1141 (noting that Heart of Atlanta found Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 valid "as applied.., to a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers"
(alteration in original)).
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[i]f the dissent in McCoy were right, we would have only
needed one case to say Title II is valid, period. There would
have been no need to consider-as the Court did-whether a
single hotel or restaurant had a sufficient nexus to interstate
commerce, and could thus be federally regulated.229
There are several responses to this observation. First, Stewart was
right to note that the language in both Heart of Atlanta and Katzen-
bach suggest that the Supreme Court had conducted an as-applied
review. Heart of Atlanta plainly reads: "[tihe sole question posed [in
this case] is ... the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as applied to these facts. ' 230 Likewise, Katzenbach states: "[t]he sole
question... narrows down to whether Title H, as applied to [Ollie's
Barbecue] restaurant . . . is a valid exercise of the power of Con-
gress."
2 3
'
While the Court rightly applied the statutory language to Ollie's
Barbecue and the Heart of Atlanta Motel, it was required to do so.
Recall that "a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be ap-
plied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other
situations not before the Court. 232 Since the Court has not recog-
nized the overbreadth doctrine outside of the limited confines of the
233First Amendment, petitioners must present the Court with the facts
of their case and contend-as they did in Heart of Atlanta-that
"Congress in passing this Act exceeded its power to regulate com-
merce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution of the United
States., 234 Thus, the Court's application of the general statute to the
facts at hand in Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach was both expected
and unremarkable.235 In distinguishing the Supreme Court's approach
in these cases from the approach taken in the Ninth Circuit, it is im-
portant to note that in neither Heart of Atlanta nor Katzenbach did the
Supreme Court engage in the sort of surgical excision of trivial in-
stances from an otherwise rationally defined class of regulated activ-
229 1d -at 1141-42.
230 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,249 (1964) (emphasis adde i).
231 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1964) (emphasis added) (noting that
Ollie's Barbecue only received about $70,000 worth of food which had moved in interstate
commerce).232 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,610 (1973).
233 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
234 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 243-44. This, of course, is the essence of the facial chal-
lenge.
235 Judge Kozinksi was right to point out that "whether a given statute can constitutionally
be applied to a claimant is an inquiry that occurs in every constitutional case." United States v.
Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003).
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ity as was performed in McCoy and Stewart. 236 This, indeed, the Su-
preme Court has never done.
More significant than the Court applying the statute to the facts be-
fore it, however, is the Court's analysis and the test it applied for de-
termining the constitutionality of the law.237 In Heart of Atlanta, it
was "admitted that the operation of the motel brings it within the pro-
visions of § 201(a) of the Act and that appellant refused to provide
lodging for transient Negroes because of their race or color. 23 Thus,
the Court recognized that in deciding the constitutionality of the stat-
ute the determinative test of the Commerce Clause power was simply
whether the regulated activity is "'commerce which concerns more
States than one' and has real and substantial relation to the national
interest.
239
The Court then explained in Heart of Atlanta that it would apply a
"rational basis" test when reviewing Congress's commerce-based
statutes:
The commerce power invoked here by the Congress is a spe-
cific and plenary one authorized by the Constitution itself.
The only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational
basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected
commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it
selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate.
If they are, appellant has no "right" to select its guests as it
sees fit, free from governmental regulation.2 4°
Significantly, the Court made no mention of whether the peculiar
activities of one Georgia motel could be exempted from the general
provisions of the statute. The only two-fold inquiry the Court made
was whether the petitioner was a member of the regulated class, and
whether that class of activity was constitutionally regulable.
The class of activities test and its standard of judicial review were
then followed and crystallized in Katzenbach v. McClung:
236 Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach do not parse their respective statutes by exempting
certain kinds of de minimis activities from a general statutory class. Both cases uphold the
statutes in their entirety, finding that the activity at issue is indeed part of the regulable class.
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241; Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294.
237 Merely because the Court takes measure of the facts of the case does not mean it has
abandoned the facial inquiry for the as-applied. See, for example, United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995), in which the Court took account of the facts at issue.
238 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 249.
23 9 
Id. at 255.
240Id. at 258-59.
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[T]he mere fact that Congress has said when particular activ-
ity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude fur-
ther examination by this Court. But where we find that the
legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them,
have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme
necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is
at an end. The only remaining question ... is whether the
particular restaurant either serves or offers to serve interstate
travelers or serves food a substantial portion of which has
241
moved in interstate commerce.
Again, the Court sought only to determine first if Congress can regu-
late the general class of activity, 42 and then whether the petitioner
was a member of the class. If Congress was barred from regulating
the class, the challenge would have been sustained, and the statute
struck down. If the petitioner was found not to be a member of the
statutorily defined class, the statute would have remained good law,
and the petitioner found simply not to have violated it. Despite the
reference to an "as-applied" challenge, this was precisely the analysis
employed in both Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach-the facial analy-
sis.
Having first cited to Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach, Judge Koz-
inski then suggested that Wickard v. Filburn243 presented an as-
applied challenge as well. 244 "Had the Court deemed regulation of the
business of agriculture a sufficient basis for upholding the application
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to Filburn," he reasoned, "there
would have been no need for it to analyze how his particular activities
affected interstate commerce. 245 Wickard, however, did not seek to
determine whether Congress could regulate the "business of agricul-
ture." Indeed, the Court suggested that Roscoe Filburn's contention
that the Agricultural Adjustment Act exceeded Congress's commerce
power 246 "would merit little consideration since ... United States v.
Darby sustain[ed] the federal power to regulate production of goods
for commerce, except for the fact that this Act extends federal regula-
241 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
242 Following Lopez and Morrison the circuit courts have generally applied Lopez's three-
pronged view of regulable commerce, and have adopted Morrison's four-factor test for deter-
mining if a class of activity "substantially affects" commerce.
3317 U.S. 111 (1942).
244 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003).
245/Id.
246 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118 (noting that "[iut is urged that under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution, Article I, § 8, clause 3, Congress does not possess the power it has in this
instance sought to exercise").
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tion to production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly
for consumption on the farm., 247  The class of activity at issue in
Wickard was the intrastate disposal of wheat "by feeding (in any
form) to poultry or livestock which, or the products of which, are
sold, bartered, or exchanged, or to be so disposed of. '248 The ques-
tion was whether Congress could regulate such intrastate activity by
fixing "a quota [on] all that the farmer may harvest for sale or for his
own farm needs. 2 49 Thus, the class at issue was not as broad as the
"business of agriculture," but was nonetheless a general and rationally
defined class of activity. To determine whether Congress could con-
stitutionally regulate this class of activity, the Court traced the history
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence and concluded that it would con-
sider "the actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate
commerce."
250
Importantly, however, the "actual effects of the activity in ques-
tion" did not refer to an Ohio farmer's personal wheat crop. The "ac-
tivity in question" was framed at the outset of the opinion's Com-
merce Clause discussion as the "production [of
wheat] . . . intended . . . wholly for consumption on the farm.",251
Thus, the Court looked at whether the local activity "exerts a substan-
tial economic effect on interstate commerce"25 2 and found that "[i]t
can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as
home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price
and market conditions' 2 3 and, by extension, interstate commerce.254
It is upon this finding-and not anything peculiar to Filburn's extra
12 acres of wheat255-that the Court ruled the activities reached by
the Agricultural Adjustment Act may be constitutionally regulated
under the commerce power. To reach this conclusion, Wickard
looked to the aggregated effect of Filburn and all his fellow farmers
247 Id. (citation omitted).
248 Id. at 118-19 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(6)(A), (B)).
249Id. at 119.
25ld. at 120.
25 1 Id. at 118.
252 Id. at 125.
253 Id. at 128. This particular point, along with the Court's more famous excerpt acknowl-
edging that Filburn's "own contribution to the demand of wheat may be trivial by itself is not
enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation" because "his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial," suggests, contrary to
Judge Kozinski's assertion, that the Court was not conducting an as-applied analysis. Id. at 127-
28.
254 Id. at 128 (noting that "[h]ome-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in com-
merce").
255 See id. at 114-15 (noting that the government quota allotted 11.1 acres of wheat yield-
ing 20.1 bushels of wheat per acre, and Filburn planted 23 acres of wheat, harvesting an excess
of 239 bushels).
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"similarly situated"-that is, it considered the effect of a class of
farmers.256  From there the Court needed only to determine that
farmer Filbum was a member of that class of activity regulated under
the Act, and having done so, 257 the Court found him subject to the
statute's demands.2 58 This, in effect, completed the two-pronged ap-
proach of a facial challenge-determine if the class is regulable and
then whether the actor is in the class. It was not, in fact, an as-applied
analysis at all, as Judge Kozinski suggested.259
As a final measure of support for his position that the Court is
unlikely to "ever eliminate as-applied challenges for one particular
area of constitutional law," Judge Kozinski referenced Professor
Fallon's observation that "as-applied challenges are the basic building
,,260blocks of constitutional adjudication. Professor Fallon went on to
argue, and Judge Kozinski quoted:
[W]hen holding that a statute cannot be enforced against a
particular litigant, a court will typically apply a general norm
or test and, in doing so, may engage in reasoning that marks
the statute as unenforceable in its totality. In a practical
sense, doctrinal tests of constitutional validity can thus pro-
duce what are effectively facial challenges. Nonetheless, de-
terminations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur
only as logical outgrowths of rulings on whether statutes may
261be applied to particular litigants on particular facts.
Professor Fallon's point as adopted by Judge Kozinski is certainly
well-taken-in so far as it goes. As discussed above, a petitioner
must present the facts of her own case and not attack a Commerce
Clause statute under a strict overbreadth theory by which she alleges
that while the statute does not unjustly affect her own situation, it
improperly reaches and affects third parties. Since the litigant must
always be a member of the affected class, the challenge will always
include and thus apply to her case. The question is not whether the
court should refrain from applying its ruling to the litigant at bar, but
whether the ruling should apply only to the litigant at bar. Thus,
Judge Kozinski was right to employ Professor Fallon's preliminary
observation that all challenges initially arise at the as-applied level.262
256 d. at 127-28.
257 1d. at 114.
281d. at 133.
259 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003).
260 Id. (quoting Fallon, supra note 7, at 1328).
261 Id. (quoting Fallon, supra note 7, at 1327-28) (alteration in original).
262 Fallon, supra note 7, at 1326.
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Professor Fallon's more significant claim, however, was that
"there is no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as-
applied, litigation, 263 as illustrated by his suggestion that the as-
applied attack always underlies the facial challenge. 26 Examining
Professor Fallon's position in full lies beyond the capacity of this
Note, but it is important to recognize his point, as Judge Kozinski did,
that in deciding as-applied cases courts employ doctrinal tests for
determining a law's constitutional validity.265 Those doctrinal tests
are often applied in ways that determine whether "a statute is invalid
in whole or in part, and not merely as applied. 266 Thus, in Professor
Fallon's estimation, "the availability of facial challenges varies on a
doctrine-by-doctrine basis and is a function of the applicable substan-
tive tests of constitutional validity., 267 The properly conceived doc-
trinal test to be applied in Commerce Clause cases should be the class
of activities test, and this test, once applied, demands that the statute
be found valid or invalid "in whole or in part, and not merely as ap-
plied."268
Professor Fallon ultimately seems likely to disagree with this posi-
tion, arguing instead that "once a case is brought, no general categori-
cal line bars a court from making broader pronouncements of invalid-
ity in properly 'as-applied' cases. Nor is there a distinctive class of
'facial challenge' cases in which the court is required to do sO.
' 269
But the Supreme Court has invariably abstained from invalidating
Commerce Clause statutes on an as-applied basis. That is, the Court
has engaged in the facial analysis of determining whether the class of
activity at issue is a constitutionally regulable class, and then whether
the petitioner was a member of that class. Indeed, the Court's unani-
mous Jones v. United States270 decision in 2000 effectively applied
the very class of activities test this Note proposes. Jones ruled that
the petitioner did not violate the arson provisions of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1970271 because the property he ignited was not
2631 d. at 1324.
264 1d. at 1327-28.
265 See id. at 1324. Professor Fallon describes the following recurring kinds of tests:
"Purpose" tests identify statutes as invalid if enacted for constitutionally forbidden
motives. If a bad motive infects one statutory subrule, it typically will infect all oth-
ers. "Suspect-content" tests, under which statutes that regulate on certain bases must
be justified as narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, have similar
effects. A statute that fails a suspect-content test is invalid in whole.
Id. at 1338.
266 1d. at 1324.
2
67 Id.
26
SId.
269 1d. at 1339.
270529 U.S. 848 (2000).
271 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000) (making it a federal crime to damage or destroy, "by means
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covered by the express provisions of the Act.272 In analyzing whether
Jones could be convicted under the federal arson statute, "[t]he proper
inquiry," wrote Justice Ginsburg, "'is into the function of the building
itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects inter-
state commerce.',, 273 That is, was the building in the regulated class,
and was the class regulable? The Supreme Court, unlike the courts in
Stewart and McCoy, has never ruled that a Commerce Clause statute
is facially constitutional, that the petitioner violated the statute, but
that the petitioner's particular activity nevertheless lies beyond Con-
gress's reach. Moreover, the limited grant of the broad congressional
power to regulate commerce among the States has in fact drawn a
"categorical line" requiring courts to examine classes of activity, and
not de minimis instances. The Constitution, in these cases, provides a
simple Hobson's choice.
D. The Clean Air Act in United States v. Ho
Federal prosecutors convicted Eric Ho in 2002274 for violating
multiple sections of the Clean Air Act (the "Act"). 75 Ho, a natural-
ized 6migr6 from the Republic of China, failed to comply with the
Act's asbestos work practice standards,276 and failed to give notice of
27727his intent to remove asbestos. A Houston-area entrepreneur,278 Ho
purchased the abandoned Alief General Hospital with "extensive as-
bestos in the hospital's fireproofing. '' 279  Ho renovated the hospital
of fire or an explosive, any... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity
affecting interstate or foreign commerce").
272Jones, 529 U.S. at 855. The key issue was the Court's interpretation of the statute's
word "used." The Court noted that:
The Government correctly observes that § 844(i) excludes no particular type of
building (it covers "any building"); the provision does, however, require that the
building be "used" in an activity affecting commerce. That qualification is most sen-
sibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a
passive, passing, or past connection to commerce .... The Government does not al-
lege that the Indiana residence involved in this case served as a home office or the
locus of any commercial undertaking.
Id. at 855-56.273 Id. at 854 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The Court did not strike down the arson statute as-
applied to Jones and "others similarly situated." Rather, it determined that because the class of
property that Jones destroyed was outside the statute's purview, Jones did not violate the statute.
Id. at 859.
274 United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 2002).
275 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
27642 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (2000).
27742 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(B) (2000); Ho, 311 F.3d at 591.
278 Ho owned and operated the Houston Fruitland produce supply and the Ho Ho Ho Ex-
press trucking company. Ho, 311 F.3d at 591.
2 7 9Id.
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himself, 280 in direct violation of health and safety codes, 281 until an
unfortunate gas line explosion "blew a hole in the exterior wall of the
hospital" and prompted an OSHA enforcement action against Ho.282
Appealing his two-count conviction for violating the Clean Air
Act's asbestos work practice and notice requirements, Ho argued that
these provisions exceeded congressional authority under the Com-
merce Clause.283 The Fifth Circuit stressed the limited holding of its
opinion in Ho, noting that it did "not confront a facial challenge to the
Clean Air Act, but only an as-applied challenge to the work practice
standard provision and the reporting provision of the CAA.' '284 Al-
though this language hints at an as-applied analysis, it is important to
recognize that the court heard the as-applied attack to a specific statu-
tory provision, and not to specific, de minimis facts-a distinction
more fully discussed below.
Recall that a Commerce Clause facial challenge, whether aimed at
the entire Clean Air Act or merely one of its many provisions, should
proceed along the two-part analysis. The court should determine if
the class of activity sufficiently relates to interstate commerce in or-
der that Congress may regulate it, then determine if the petitioner is
indeed a member of the regulated class. A negative answer to the
first inquiry should result in the court finding the statute facially inva-
lid. A negative answer to the second question shows only that the
petitioner did not violate the law, and the statute remains unaffected
by the challenge. Positive answers to both questions, however,
should result in a conviction under a facially constitutional regulation.
Thus, under no circumstances may the court uphold the commerce-
2
80 Id.
281 The court described the asbestos removal as follows:
Against customary asbestos abatement practices, the workers used no water as they
removed the fireproofing, but only scraped off the fireproofing, which produced
large amounts of asbestos-containing dust inside the hospital. As the workers re-
moved the fireproofing, they placed it in plastic bags .... The hospital remained un-
sealed throughout, with several open doors and windows and a large hole in the sec-
ond floor exterior wall. None of these practices complied with asbestos work prac-
tice standards.
Id. at 592 (emphasis omitted).
282 Id. TDH inspectors investigating the explosion discovered the following:
They found the hospital unsealed, with open windows and doors and, now, two holes
in the exterior walls. Fireproofing dust covered floors and shelves, and the building
contained roughly 100 open bags of fireproofing and sheetrock residue. Subsequent
laboratory analysis of the fireproofing indicated two to twenty percent chrysolite as-
bestos; any material with more than one percent is subject to federal and state regula-
tions.
Id. at 592-93.
3 Id. at 594.
284/Id. (citations omitted).
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based statute as facially constitutional, while striking it down as-
applied to a particular litigant. The court has only Hobson's choice.
In Ho, the second piece of the facial analysis was uncontested and
easily resolved.285 As the court explained, "Section 113, 42 U.S.C. §
7413, contains administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement
mechanisms for the asbestos work practice standard and the notice
requirement. Ho was convicted under two of these criminal enforce-
ment provisions. '286 The court noted that neither party disputed that
the hospital contained the regulated kind and amount of asbestos or,
therefore, that the work practice standard covered the hospital.287
Judge Smith summarized the regulatory framework and the legal du-
ties that Ho allegedly violated as (1) the failure to follow proper work
practice standards while removing asbestos, and (2) the failure to no-
tify the EPA of his intent to remove asbestos.288 After a detailed ac-
count of the asbestos work practice standard regulations and the noti-
fication requirements governing asbestos removal in renovation
289
sites, the court concluded that Ho had admitted that he complied
with neither of these provisions. 290 Thus, the only remaining question
was whether asbestos removal was a general class of activity, ration-
ally defined by Congress,29' with a sufficient connection to interstate
commerce so as to bring it under the regulatory purview of the federal
government.
292
The court restated the three broad categories of constitutionally
regulable Commerce Clause activity as described in Lopez,293 and
determined that the asbestos removal and notification requirements at
issue fell within the third category-an activity that substantially af-
294fects interstate commerce. The court explained that the only theory
285 Id. at 595-96.
286 Id. at 595.
2 87 Id.
288 Id.
289 The court recounted the following asbestos work practice standard regulations:
For example, material containing asbestos must be wetted during removal, kept suf-
ficiently wet after removal to prevent the release of asbestos fibers, and stored in
leak-tight containers until properly disposed. A foreman or management-level offi-
cer, trained in complying with these work practice standards, must be present at any
site before workers may handle material containing asbestos.
Id.
29
o Id. (noting that "it is enough to say that Ho admits he did not comply with the asbestos
work practice standard .... Ho admits that he did not give notice").
291 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(h), 7413(c)(1), 7413(c)(2), 7414(a) (2000).
292 The court noted that "Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce." Ho, 311 F.3d at 598 (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
293 Id. at 596-602.
21A Id. at 602 (noting that the removal and notification standards do "not regulate the... in-
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by which the government could argue that asbestos removal substan-
tially affected interstate commerce 295 was the aggregation principle as
announced in Wickard and explained in Lopez and Morrison.296
Under the aggregation principle, the petitioner's contribution to in-
terstate commerce, taken on its own, would likely be insufficient to
justify federal regulation; but, his contribution combined with that of
others similarly situated would have a substantial influence on inter-
state commerce.297 Ho effectively illustrates this principle. The gov-
ernment did not argue that "Ho's isolated violation of the work prac-
tice standard at a single renovation site could, by itself, have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. Instead, the government ar-
gue[d], that similar violations, when aggregated, could substantially
affect the interstate market for asbestos removal services. 298  For
Judge Smith, the limited question presented concerned only whether
the aggregation principle extended to violations of the asbestos re-
moval standards.299
The court answered that question affirmatively, analyzing the
characteristics of asbestos removal as a class of activity in order to
determine first whether it was a commercial activity, and then
whether that activity substantially affected interstate commerce.
Noting that asbestos removal is a "booming industry" whereby many
businesses "exist solely to remove asbestos from contaminated build-
ings, 3 °1 the court called attention to asbestos removal's licensing
schemes, and speculated that virtually all asbestos removal projects
have a commercial purpose.30 2 More importantly, the court reasoned,
a national market exists for asbestos removal, and the nexus between
that market and interstate commerce is "not attenuated, but direct and
apparent., 30 3 Such a direct and substantial affect on a national, com-
mercial market, noted the court, justified using the aggregation prin-
ciple. °4
terstate shipment of a good or commodity through these channels. Nor does it seek to protect
the instrumentalities of or a thing or person in interstate commerce.").
295 Id. (noting that "the government concedes that the asbestos work practice standard can
satisfy the substantial effect test only through the aggregation principle").296 See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 560-61 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
297 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
29 8 Ho, 311 F.3d at 602.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 602-03.
301 Id. at 602.
302 Id.
30 3 Id. at 603.
304 Id. Judge Smith's application of that principle was as follows:
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But the aggregation principle would appear to be nothing more
than a glorified as-applied challenge which, as discussed above,
should not be used to invalidate mere portions of a Commerce Clause
regulation. Aggregation, after all, looks specifically at the de minimis
instance of the petitioner's activity and then imagines that activity
repeated on a broad or even national scale before determining that the
activity substantially affects commerce. For example, an as-applied
challenger in a case like Wickard v. Filburn might ask the court to
consider only the effect of his 12 extra acres of wheat, or in Ho, only
the asbestos in a small, Houston hospital. But in applying the aggre-
gation principle, the court takes a petitioner's request for a particular-
ized inquiry and instead of answering the question on the basis of that
particular de minimis instance, the court views the action as a class of
activity-private wheat production, or private asbestos removal-and
the constitutionality of the statute is evaluated as applied to the whole
class of that activity. Thus, for example, instead of looking only at
farmer Filburn's wheat, the court looks at small farm, non-
commercial wheat production, and then asks whether that broader
class of activity falls within the scope of an otherwise constitutional
statute.
The question becomes whether the court's aggregation creates a
new class of activity not considered or regulated by Congress or
whether, in fact, that aggregated class of activity was simply a sub-
class of the larger regulatory scheme that Congress has authority to
regulate. In either case, however, the court considers a class of activ-
ity and not a mere instance. The court must therefore apply the two-
pronged, class of activity analysis to determine if the class is constitu-
tionally regulable, and then if the petitioner falls within that class. If
By violating the asbestos work practice standard, which imposes costly duties on
persons and businesses engaged in asbestos removal, Ho gained a commercial ad-
vantage on licensed abatement companies. Whereas these companies must spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars on projects like Ho's, Ho was able to scrape by-
literally and figuratively-at a cut rate of barely more than $20,000 plus supplies.
His activities also deprived licensed abatement companies of a promising business
opportunity ....
Moreover, once aggregated, Ho's activities posed an [sic] threat to the interstate
commercial real estate market. His illicit asbestos removal project likely would re-
duce the number of companies providing asbestos removal services. Fewer compa-
nies means that conscientious property owners would have more trouble locating li-
censed abatement companies and likely would have to pay higher prices for the ser-
vices of remaining companies. Furthermore, Ho would gain a commercial advantage
over conscientious property owners who must pay these higher prices for asbestos
removal.
Id. at 603-04.
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the court finds the class of activity regulable, the statute survives the
challenge; and if the petitioner is not considered a member of the
class, he has simply not violated the law, presenting no constitutional
grounds for invalidating the statute. Part IV more fully discusses
whether Congress or the courts are best suited to define the class of
regulated activity, but even under the aggregation principle, the court
will strike down or uphold a commerce-based statute on its face, and
not as applied to a particular litigant.
In Ho, the court applied Wickard's aggregation principle to the
class of private asbestos removal30 5 and found the class to satisfy the
substantial effect test 3° 6 clarified in United States v. Morrison.30 7 Fol-
lowing Morrison's four-factored analysis that informs the substantial
effect test, Ho considered (1) whether the conduct was economic or
commercial in nature; (2) whether the asbestos work practice standard
contained a jurisdictional element restricting the EPA's authority to
activities tied to interstate commerce; (3) whether Congress included
congressional findings on the effects of asbestos removal on interstate
commerce; and (4) whether the link between asbestos removal ser-
vices and interstate commerce was too attenuated.30 8 Finding asbes-
tos removal to be a commercial activity regulated by a statute that
contained no jurisdictional element or congressional findings con-
cerning the activity's link to commerce, but finding instead that the
link was direct and not attenuated, the Fifth Circuit upheld the asbes-
tos work practice standard as a valid regulation of a commercial activ-
ity.
3 09
As described thus far, Ho's analysis followed a facial, class of ac-
tivities test analysis. The court took seriously the task of determining
if the class of activity-asbestos removal-was constitutionally regu-
lable under the Commerce Clause, applying the four-factored substan-
tial effect test, and determined that the petitioner was indeed a mem-
ber of the class already having stipulated to removing asbestos with-
out following the statutory prescriptions. But Ho then upheld the
305 Ho did not apply the aggregation principle without pause, but recognized the following:
Whether and how Congress may apply the aggregation principle are controversial
questions. The pitfalls are apparent. For example, any imaginable activity of man-
kind can affect the alertness, energy, and mood of human beings, which in turn can
affect their productivity in the workplace, which when aggregated together could re-
duce national economic productivity. Such reasoning would eliminate any judicially
enforceable limit on the Commerce Clause, thereby turning that clause into what it
most certainly is not, a general police power.
Id. at 599.
306 Id. at 604.
3- 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).308 Ho, 311 F.3d at 602-04.
309 Id. at 601-04.
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statute as a constitutional regulation only, in its words, as an "as-
applied challenge" to the work standard and reporting provisions.
310
Indeed, the court carefully repeated its position that it expressed "no
opinion on the constitutionality of other sections of the [Clean Air
Act] or their implementing regulations, or, for that matter, of other
environmental laws, 311 and therefore had avoided "a facial challenge
to the Clean Air Act., 312 This language misrepresents as-applied and
facial challenges.
In limiting its holding to the statutory provisions under which Eric
Ho was convicted, the court ruled on the constitutionality of the only
Clean Air Act provisions that it rightly could. The Clean Air Act in
its entirety was never the subject of Ho's constitutional challenge.313
Only the Act's notification and work practice standards requirements
of the asbestos removal sections were scrutinized, and to have struck
down or upheld any other sections of the Clean Air Act would have
moved beyond the question presented.31 4  So it is not, as the court
suggested, that the challenge was heard as-applied to a peculiar set of
circumstances, but simply that the court confronted a relatively minor
provision of a very large Act. In the end, despite its assertions to the
contrary, the court conducted a facial analysis of the challenged stat-
ute and found that the statute constitutionally regulated an entire class
of asbestos removal, and that Eric Ho violated that statute. The court
chose "the horse nearest the door," and the challenge rightly failed.
In summary, courts have been reluctant to strike down a Com-
merce Clause statute on its face. To avoid the graver constitutional
questions, courts have instead redefined classes or sub-classes of ac-
tivity to be excised as trivial instances beyond congressional reach.
While seemingly consistent with the theory of constitutional avoid-
ance, this approach fails to recognize that the case and controversy at
issue in a Commerce Clause challenge is a facial one, namely,
whether Congress has the authority to regulate the class of activity.
The above discussion has demonstrated how courts have analyzed
Congress's commerce power, the endemic problems with that analy-
sis, and has proposed a method for analyzing that power correctly.
310 Id. at 594.
311 Id. at 604. Recognizing the limited scope of its opinion, the court stated: "We thus have
neither occasion nor authority to rule on the constitutionality of other provisions of the CAA or
other implementing regulations, which we must leave for another day when they are properly
presented." Id. at 594.312 Id. at 594.
313 See id. (noting that "Ho contends that the laws under which he was convicted exceed
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause").314 See id.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
IV. ILLS & REMEDIES: ATTACK OF THE "AD Hoc NULLIFICATION
MACHINE" AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF JURISDICTIONAL
ELEMENTS
Was this the face that launched a thousand ships
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium?
- Christopher Marlowe, Dr. Faustus
315
It would be misleading to ignore the difficulties presented by this
Note's Hobson-like proposal. This Part addresses some of the likely
resistance to hearing only facial challenges to the commerce power.
First, it attempts to calm the fear that trading-in the judge's as-applied
whittling knife for the facial broad sword in Commerce Clause cases
will be more than our delicate system of checks-and-balances can
bear. Second, it explains why Congress, and not the courts, is respon-
sible for outlining the classes of regulated activity. And finally, this
Part considers Congress's use of the "jurisdictional element" in its
statutory language as a means of avoiding facial invalidation. This
discussion, intended to summarize rather than propel this Note, will
be more cursory than comprehensive in resolving the difficulties and
objections raised by the "class of activities" test.
A chief concern in requiring facial challenges to Commerce Clause
provisions may be that the courts will seize upon the U.S. Code like
an "ad hoc nullification machine," 316 to borrow a phrase from Justice
Scalia, striking down whole statutes passed pursuant to the wisdom of
the elected branches of government. Recall that facial invalidation is
considered "manifestly, strong medicine" to be prescribed spar-
ingly. 317 Thus, as a policy concern, it may be feared that requiring
courts to uphold or invalidate whole provisions will embolden the
judiciary to abuse its authority to "say what the law is."'318 Underly-
ing this concern is the premonition that expanding the facial chal-
lenge's use will diminish the judiciary's "[d]ue respect for the deci-
315 CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, DR. FAUSTUS sc. 12, 11. 80-8 1.
316 See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 (1994) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the Supreme Court's role in the
context of abortion laws: "Today the ad hoc nullification machine claims its latest, greatest, and
most surprising victim ..."); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the Court's role in adjudicating an abortion statute: "[I]t therefore enjoys
the benefit of the 'ad hoc nullification machine' that the Court has set in motion to push aside
whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored practice.").
317Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998) (quoting Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,613 (1973)).318 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
[Vol. 55:1
2004]TURNING THE COMMERCE CLA USE CHALLENGE "ON ITS FACE" 205
sions of a coordinate branch of Government," 319 thereby upsetting the
balance of separated powers.
This is a reasonable fear. After all, the facial attack certainly
strikes a broader, deadlier blow to federal statutes than does the as-
applied challenge.320 It is not clear, however, that the "ad hoc nullifi-
cation machine" will operate any more recklessly under the proposed
class of activities test than it allegedly already does.321 In examining
the lower courts' treatment of Commerce Clause statutes in the wake
of Lopez and Morrison, Professors Denning and Reynolds discovered
that "in nearly two years following Morrison, only one statute has
been held unconstitutional on its face, and that decision did not sur-
vive en banc review. 322 Conceding that the judiciary has been "mar-
ginally more comfortable sustaining as applied challenges ' 323 to com-
merce-based laws, Denning and Reynolds concluded that "[e]ven here
the courts have been circumspect, ' 324 finding "only nine cases in
which a defendant's conviction was overturned., 325  Rather than
abuse or even widely exercise its post-Morrison discretion to invali-
319United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); see also Jones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) (reiterating the "guiding principle that 'where a statute is susceptible
of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by-
the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter"') (quoting United
States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
32°See Buck, supra note 94, at 431 (noting that facial challenges allow the court to order
the government "not to apply the law to anyone ever again").
32t See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAw 16-22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (discussing the dangers of using legislative history
and intent as a means of statutory interpretation). Justice Scalia has warned that courts focusing
on legislative histories instead of statutory language results in the judiciary substituting what the
law should say for what it actually says-a process not too dissimilar from statutory nullifica-
tion:
When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the
basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection between
the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself
what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely bring you
to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean-which is pre-
cisely how judges decide things under the common law ....
... It is simply not compatible with democratic theory that laws mean whatever they
ought to mean, and that unelected judges decide what that is.
Id. at 18, 22.322 Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2003).
323Id.
324 Id.
3251d. at 1262 & n.62 (citing the following cases: United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 2001); United States v. John-
son, 246 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ryan, 227 F.3d
1058 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Ramey, No. 98-7069, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 14316 (4th Cir. June 20, 2000); United States v.
Rayborn, 138 F.Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)).
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date Commerce Clause legislation, the judiciary has largely "declined
to read Morrison to require that earlier cases be overruled or even
seriously reexamined. ' '316  Moreover, Denning and Reynolds have
found courts "quick to invoke circuit rules against overruling circuit
precedent and the rules against anticipatory overruling of Supreme
Court cases," and have argued that "[s]uch a 'desk clearing mentality'
makes it difficult to credit the predictions of Lopez and Morrison's
harshest critics: that they will result in courts striking down all man-
ner of federal statutes.,
327
By contrast, it is worth noting, the as-applied challenge runs the
risk of nullifying legislative action in precisely the sort of ad hoc
fashion that Justice Scalia has urged courts to avoid.328 Indeed, creat-
ing exemptions, excising instances, and withholding the effect of cer-
tain laws to certain litigants threaten a far more ad hoc approach than
employing a doctrinal "class of activities" test to assess a law's con-
stitutional validity.329 One need only look to the cases discussed
above to see the as-applied challenge substituting the judge's prefer-
ence for the language of the text.330 In United States v. Corp, for ex-
ample, the Sixth Circuit opted for a "case-by-case" analysis in which
it effectively added elements to the offense in order to determine if
326 1d. at 1263.
327 Id. at 1264-65.
328 See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting).
Describing the majority's as-applied approach in McCoy, Judge Trott argued:
They have attempted to restrict their holding to McCoy and to others "similarly situ-
ated," but it is not clear to me that the law permits such a limitation. I so conclude
because McCoy's conduct clearly falls within the language of the statute, and be-
cause the Supreme Court appears under such circumstances to have ruled out "as ap-
plied" challenges in Commerce Clause cases. In my view, if the conduct under re-
view falls within the plain language of the statute, precedent requires us to take the
statute head on, not carve out pieces of it.
Id. (emphasis added).
329 Voicing a similar concern in the context of Due Process adjudication, then-Justice
Rehnquist, in dissenting from Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, advocated a "principled"
rather than an "ad hoc" approach in balancing the costs and benefits of procedural due process.
This customary "balancing" inquiry conducted by the Court in these [Due Process]
cases reaches a result that is quite unobjectionable, but it seems to me that it is de-
void of any principles which will either instruct or endure. The balance is simply an
ad hoc weighing which depends to a great extent upon how the Court subjectively
views the underlying interests at stake. The results in previous cases and in these
cases have been quite unpredictable .... The lack of any principled standards in this
area means that these procedural due process cases will recur time and again.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562-63 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).330See SCALIA, supra note 321, at 14 (arguing that approaching statutes and statutory in-
terpretation with "the Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for incom-
petence and usurpation."). Justice Scalia further contends that the Court's "usurpation," by
which unelected judges decide that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, is "simply not
compatible with democratic theory." Id. at 22.
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the petitioner violated the statute.33' The court considered the fol-
lowing factors in making its decision:
Was the activity in this case related to explicit graphic pic-
tures of children engaged in sexual activity .. for commer-
cial or exploitive purposes? Were there multiple children so
pictured? Were the children otherwise sexually abused? Was
there a record that defendant repeatedly engaged in such con-
duct or other sexually abusive conduct with children? 332
Only the first question involves an actual element of the offense as
described in the statute.333 How the number of children, their "other-
wise abuse," and the record of the repeated conduct establishes
whether Patrick Corp fell within the "heartland ' 334 of the statute is
unclear. Similarly, in United States v. Stewart, Judge Kozinski rec-
ognized a sub-class of machinegun-holders, effectively inserting the
word "homemade" into the statutory language, and thus carved an
exception from an otherwise rationally and legislatively defined class
of activity. 335  In these cases,336 affording the courts the as-applied
challenge did not spare us ad hoc nullities; nor did it ensure, as Justice
Scalia has championed, that it is only the law that binds US. 337
The availability of the as-applied ruling in the Commerce Clause
context, rather than limiting the judiciary's intrusion upon the law,
may actually fuel the ad hoc nullification machine. Granting courts
the authority to scrape away at the surface of the law's text instead of
"taking it head on," allows for a gentler erosion of the law, but ero-
sion nonetheless. Thus, while striking down a provision on its face
331 See United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
332 Id. at 333.
333 See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)(i) (2000), making it unlawful to:
knowingly [possess] 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or
other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been
shipped ... in interstate or foreign commerce ... if the producing of such visual de-
piction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
Id.
334 See Corp, 236 F.3d at 327 (noting that the prosecution stipulated that "the circum-
stances of the case were outside the 'heartland' of cases involving § 2252(a)(4)(B)).
335 See United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
336 In addition to those just discussed, see United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[like the Sixth Circuit [in Corp], we agree that there are some
categories of conduct which, whether or not literally covered by a statute on its face, cannot be
said to 'substantially affect' interstate commerce").337 See SCALIA, supra note 321, at 17 (arguing that "[i]t is the law that governs, not the in-
tent of the lawgiver .... Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact
which bind us"); see also id. at 22 ("The text is the law, and it is the text that must be ob-
served.").
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may be "strong medicine," demanding that litigants "go for broke, 338
it may in fact reduce the court's ad hoc style of adjudication by forc-
ing the court to confront the law with a doctrinal test and a more thor-
ough scrutiny of whether the statute Congress passed satisfies the
requirements of Lopez and Morrison.
This discussion, and Justice Scalia's underlying concern, begs the
question of why Congress, and not the courts, is responsible for out-
lining the classes of regulated activity. Why, for example, should the
courts be barred from declaring, as Judge Reinhardt did in McCoy,
that the statute is invalid as applied to the claimant and "others simi-
larly situated"? 339 As argued above, by adding "others similarly situ-
ated" to Rhonda McCoy, Judge Reinhardt effectively conducted a
facial analysis that defined a new class of activity, namely, "intrastate
possession of a non-commercial and non-economic character. ' 34°
There are indeed contexts in which it is perfectly acceptable for the
judiciary to classify activities and draw the necessary distinctions
between those classes341-the Commerce Clause context is not one of
them. The power to regulate "Commerce ...among the several
States"' 342 is the power "to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to
be governed, 34  which, in turn, is the power to define and govern
classes of activity.3" That power, according to the Constitution and
the Supreme Court, vests only in Congress. Thus, engaging in an
analysis whereby courts recognize new classes or sub-classes of activ-
ity, distinct from the classes prescribed by the congressional statute, is
flawed and illegitimate. As the Sixth Circuit has opined, while it may
be "tempting" to construe a statute narrowly so as to save it from a
petitioner's challenge, "it would require [the] court to take out its blue
pencil to add an exception ... to the [statutory] definition. This kind
of modification is reserved for the legfslature." 346 Whereas it may be
338 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 77 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
339 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1133 (ruling that "as applied to McCoy and others similarly situ-
ated, § 2252(a)(4)(B) cannot be upheld as a valid exercises of the Commerce Clause power"
(emphasis in original)).
340Id. at 1132.
341 See, for example, antitrust law, where Congress has deferred to the court's almost ex-
clusive classification of trusts and monopolies.
342 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
343 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995) (quoting Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)).
344 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971) (noting that the commerce power
"extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the
power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of
a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce"
(quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)).
345 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553.
346Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 2004).
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the peculiar province of the court to "say what the law is, '3 4 7 it is left
to Congress to define for itself the classes of commercial activity it
intends to govern. The only question for the courts to answer is
whether those classes are within reach of the federal grasp.348
The final point to consider is whether Congress can employ a more
effective method for exercising its commerce power, and thereby
defend its Commerce Clause regulations against facial attack. Includ-
ing an "express jurisdictional element" may provide a limited, but
effective defense. A jurisdictional element limits the statute's reach
"to a discrete set of [regulated intrastate activities] that additionally
have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.,
349
Morrison explained that "[s]uch a jurisdictional element may estab-
lish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of in-
terstate commerce." 350 That is, it demonstrates Congress's view that
the activity in question falls within one of the three broad categories
of regulable activity. 35' Including an express jurisdictional element
effectively binds the regulated activity to interstate commerce, and
thus requires the prosecution (in a criminal context) to show the con-
nection between the defendant's class of activity and interstate com-
merce. That showing then becomes part of the underlying offense-
an element to be proved at trial.
352
Despite one district court's observation that "[a]fter Lopez, courts
have 'repeatedly found the inclusion of [a] jurisdictional
element... sufficient to overcome Commerce Clause challenges,' ' 353
the jurisdictional element does not insulate the statute from judicial
review, nor guarantee that the courts will find it constitutional.354  As
347 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that "[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is").348 Perez, 402 U.S. at 152 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941)).
39United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995).
350 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000).
351 See United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 600 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2002) (observing that in addi-
tion to the substantial-effect category, "[a] jurisdictional element also may establish that a stat-
ute comes within the first or second category of Commerce Clause regulation identified in
Lopez").
352 See, e.g., United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003). The McCoy
court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) outlawed child-pomography "which was produced
using material which have been mailed or so shipped or transported," and thus that "federal
jurisdiction was premised upon the place of manufacture of the camera and film used to take the
pictures." Id. (emphasis omitted). Therefore, the prosecution needed to establish that the mate-
rials used to create the illicit photographs were produced out of state. Id.
353 United States v. Merritt, No. IPO1-0081-CF-01 T/F, 2001 WL 1708830, at *3 (S.D. Ind.
Nov. 8, 2001) (quoting Gillespie v. City ofIndianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1999)),
aft'd, 361 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2004)
354See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) ("[Slimply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.");
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the Fifth Circuit has made clear, a "jurisdictional element is not alone
sufficient to render [a challenged statute] constitutional. 355 Rather,
the jurisdictional element will guide courts in conducting the appro-
priate facial analysis. That is, by making the jurisdictional element an
essential element of the prosecution's case, the court can then prop-
erly rule that the statute is constitutional on its face, thereby preserv-
ing the statute, while still determining whether the petitioner did or
did not violate the statute's terms. In this way, the court can avoid
improperly finding the statute unconstitutional as-applied to the chal-
lenger and "others similarly situated," and make the Hobson's
choice.356
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Jones v. United
States357 illustrates precisely how the jurisdictional element allows
this scenario to unfold. The federal arson statute under review crimi-
nalized damaging or destroying "by means of fire or an explosive,
any ... property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any ac-
tivity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 358  As mentioned
above, Jones applied the proposed class of activities analysis3 59 and
determined that although petitioner Dewey Jones did in fact toss a
Molotov cocktail through the window of an Indiana home, 360 he did
not violate the relevant provisions of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.36 The Court focused on the nature of the property Jones
destroyed and found it beyond the express jurisdictional terms of the
Act:
see also United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) ("At some level, of
course, everything we own is composed of something that once traveled in commerce. This
cannot mean that everything is subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, else
that constitutional limitation would be entirely meaningless.").355 Ho, 311 F.3d at 600 (quoting United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir.
2000)) (alteration in original). For a contrasting view, see United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d
196, 204 (3d Cir. 2001), which held that a commerce-based statute with a jurisdictional hook
will always survive a facial challenge.
356 In its interpretation of Morrison's jurisdictional element factor, the Fifth Circuit warned
Congress, to "not add the words 'interstate commerce' to every statute and expect the courts
meekly to comply." Ho, 311 F.3d at 600. Exercising the commerce power still requires the
necessary nexus between the regulated class of activity and interstate commerce as explained in
Lopez and Morrison.
357 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
35 Id. at 850 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
359 See id. at 854-55 (noting that "the proper inquiry... 'is into the function of the building
itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce"' (quoting
United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
360 Id. at 851.
361 See id. at 852-59 (holding that defendant did not violate the relevant provisions of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970).
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The Government correctly observes that § 844(i) excludes no
particular type of building (it covers "any building"); the pro-
vision does, however, require that the building be "used" in
an activity affecting commerce. That qualification is most
sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial
purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connec-
tion to commerce ....
The Government does not allege that the Indiana resi-
dence involved in this case served as a home office or the lo-
cus of any commercial undertaking.
3 62
Thus, because the damaged property was not "used in" interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court vacated Jones' conviction 363 and left
the statute wholly in place.36 Such analysis, guided by the inclusion
of an express jurisdictional element, will ensure that the broad blade
of the facial challenge does not unduly strike at the federal law, while
also sheathing the court's as-applied pocket knife that would other-
wise carve from the law its own de minimis exclusions.
CONCLUSION
For now we see through a glass, darkly;
but then face to face ....
- I Corinthians 13:12
In the context of the Commerce Clause, litigants and judges have
only a Hobson's choice-they may assess cases facially, or not at all.
The structure of the Commerce Clause and the power it grants to
Congress allows the legislature to regulate classes of activity that
Congress has found to substantially affect interstate commerce. It is
that structure that in turn requires a petitioner to challenge a com-
merce-based statute on its face-to argue that it is invalid for all
members of the class or for none. As a corollary, the as-applied chal-
lenge is therefore inappropriate for Commerce Clause adjudication.
362 Id. at 855-56.
363See id. at 859.
364 Id. at 859. The Court held:
[T]he provision covers only property currently used in commerce or in an activity af-
fecting commerce. The home owned and occupied by petitioner Jones's cousin was
not so used-it was a dwelling place used for everyday family living. As we read §
844(i), Congress left cases of this genre to the law enforcement authorities of the
States.
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By looking to the de minimis instances of a petitioner's regulated ac-
tivity, the successful as-applied challenge exempts that activity from
the statute's otherwise constitutional reach. In Commerce Clause
cases, such considerations have been rejected repeatedly by the Su-
preme Court, and no Supreme Court decision has ever purported to
carve a singular litigant's activity from an otherwise rationally and
constitutionally defined class.
In keeping with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, the courts
should employ a two-pronged doctrinal test when analyzing a peti-
tioner's Commerce Clause challenge. This "class of activities" test
should seek to determine first, whether Congress may constitutionally
regulate the class of activity in question-a consideration that looks
to the tests given in United States v. Lopez and United States v. Mor-
rison-and second, whether the petitioner is indeed a member of that
class of activity, as in Jones v. United States. In this way, Commerce
Clause statutes will be adjudicated facially, and not as applied only to
the peculiar facts of the claimant's case.
As a final measure, this Note has recognized that the classic facial
challenge traditionally has been viewed as a dose of "strong medi-
cine" administered sparingly so as to respect the wisdom and preroga-
tives of the legislative branch. The understandable concern that
broadening the use of the facial challenge will empower the judiciary
beyond the safeguards of our neatly balanced federalist structure re-
quires Congress to take seriously its law-crafting task and make clear
its intentions with plainly stated jurisdictional elements. The courts
can then review congressional enactments appropriately, determining
whether Congress has adequately shown the class of activity to affect
interstate commerce, and whether the prosecution has convincingly
placed the petitioner within that class. Within this analytical frame-
work, the courts must refrain from an ad hoc, as-applied approach that
invalidates congressional action piece-by-piece. Instead, the judiciary
must be prepared to confront the law face to face and according to the
structural demands of the Constitution and its Commerce Clause.
Thus, the courts have been afforded a "choice." Thomas Hobson
would be proud. NATHANIEL STEWART*
t The author is indebted to and grateful for the inspiration and aid of Jonathan H. Adler,
Robert D. Alt, and Jennifer R. Gowens whose tireless efforts helped bring this Note to print. Of
course, this Note would never have been attempted, let alone completed, were it not for the true
and loving sacrifices of my wife, Diana.
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